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1. Introduction 
 
    1.1. Research objectives 
 
Hostile takeovers have been extensively explored during the past years due to their 
increased presence in global M&A activity. Considerable attention has been dedicated to 
the rising complexity of takeover strategies and anti-takeover defence mechanisms 
employed by target companies and the impact of these on shareholders’ wealth. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the background and bitter fight to stay independent 
of one of Britain’s most loved brands, Cadbury Plc., drawing upon existing theories.    
The thesis tries to find answers to the following questions: 
 What was the rationale behind Cadbury’s takeover? 
 What takeover defence mechanisms did the board of Cadbury employ and how 
effective were these in maximizing shareholders’ wealth? 
 Did the price offered by Kraft Foods represent the fair value of Cadbury? 
The paper is divided into seven main chapters. The introduction presents the research 
objectives and short outline of the case analysed. The second chapter provides a theoretical 
framework for hostile takeovers. The third chapter reviews the most commonly employed 
anti-takeover defence mechanisms and the implication of their use. The forth chapter is 
dedicated to the analysis of the background and motivation of Kraft Foods’ hostile 
takeover offer as well as the defence tactics applied by Cadbury Plc. Chapter five outlines 
the theoretical foundation for the Cadbury’s valuation conducted in chapter six, with the 
aim of providing an estimate of the target’s fair value. Chapter seven summarizes and 
concludes.  
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1.2. Background of Kraft Foods Inc. offer for Cadbury Plc. 
 
 
On the 9
th
 of November 2009 Kraft Foods launched its official hostile takeover offer to 
acquire Cadbury Plc., one of Great Britain’s most loved brands, for a total consideration of 
GBP 11.6bn, after its initial bid of GBP 10.2bn in September was promptly rejected by 
Cadbury’s board.1 The combination with Cadbury would create a global confectionery 
leader, providing economies of scale to compete even more effectively in the confectionery 
sector. 
 
The offer represented a cash plus stock proposal, Cadbury’s shareholders being entitled to 
300 pence in cash and 0.2589 new Kraft Foods shares, for each Cadbury share. This valued 
Cadbury’s share at GBP 7.17, representing a premium of 29% over the company’s 90 day 
average share price of GBP 5.55.
2
 The offer was seen as “derisory” by Cadbury’s CEO 
Roger Carr and as a consequence was rejected.
3
 
After five months of resistance, speculation about possible rivals making a counterbid and 
Cadbury’s share price hitting all-time highs, Kraft Foods decided to sweeten the deal, 
offering GBP 8.50 for Cadbury’s shares, but changing the stock-cash ratio offered to 40% 
stock and 60% cash (initial offer: 60% stock and 40% cash). Cadbury’s board decided to 
give in and recommended the offer to its shareholders. As a consequence, the deal was 
sealed on the 19
th
 of January 2010, ending the era of an “iconic and unique British 
company.”4    
 
The loss of the 186-year-old British icon fuelled public protests and resistance from UK 
regulators. As a response to the public pressure generated by the transaction, the Takeover 
Panel decided to correct the perceived tactical instability, which favoured bidders over 
targets, by setting an automatic “put up or shut up” deadline during which the acquirer has 
to announce a fully financed bid or walk away.
5
 
 
                                                 
 
1
 Cadbury-Kraft takeover timeline (24.05.2011) 
2
 Kraft Foods Corporate/Financial News Release (09.11.2009) 
3
 Cadbury boss Roger Carr blasts Kraft’s “derisory” hostile bid (15.11.2009)  
4
 The inside story of the Cadbury takeover (12.03.2010) 
5
 Patrone (2011) 
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2. Hostile takeovers  
 
 
In a friendly takeover the target company’s board and management agree to the merger or 
acquisition by another company. The target board of directors negotiates the buyout terms 
with potential acquirers, agrees on the price and the offer is finally put to a shareholder 
vote. In contrast in a hostile takeover the acquisition of a company occurs without the 
consent of the target company’s board and management. The acquirer, also called a raider, 
either directly approaches the shareholders, making them an offer to buy enough shares to 
take over the target company or fights to replace management in order to get the 
acquisition approved.
6
 
 
 
    2.1. Impact of hostile takeovers 
 
The increasing sophistication of takeover defences, the threat of competing bids and 
regulatory changes have led to a substantial increase of returns for target shareholders.
7
 
However, the post-announcement returns depend among other things on the attitude 
towards the bid. In a successful but initially hostile takeover the target shareholders receive 
a higher premium for their shares than in a friendly approach. “When a hostile bid is made, 
the target share price immediately incorporates the expectation that opposition to the bid 
may lead to upward revision of the offer price.”  
Servaes (1991) attests on a sample of US listed companies, that target shareholders 
experience a return of 32% as a result of a hostile takeover, while the wealth effects for 
friendly bids are rather lower, amounting to 22%.
8
 
But what are further advantages of hostile takeovers over the friendly approach? One of the 
major advantages is the surprise feature of hostile takeovers. An attack without any 
warning impedes the target’s management from taking defence measures. Furthermore, as 
no negotiations are conducted, the probability of a leak and a following increase of the 
                                                 
 
6
 Berk and Demarzo (2011), p. 905  
7
 DePamphilis (2011), p. 36 
8
 Martinova and Renneboog (2008),  p. 2153 
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share price, which fuels speculative behaviour of arbitragers, are diminished. “The 
speculative increase in the target’s share price can add dramatically to the cost of the 
transaction.” The acquirer’s initial bid includes a premium over the target company’s 
current share price, expressed as a percentage of the target’s share price. Thus, an increase 
in the target’s share price as a result of speculation will consequently mean a higher 
purchase price paid by the acquirer.
9
 
In light of a hostile takeover, executives face a dilemma accepting or resisting the takeover. 
Jensen (1988) argues that executives are driven by self-interest. This self-interest is not 
only limited to monetary benefits but includes also non-monetary benefits like status, 
power, prestige and security.
10
 Empirical evidence has shown that these benefits vanish 
after hostile takeovers, as target executives are replaced by new and more efficient teams. 
The high executive turnover hypothesis after hostile takeovers is supported by a study of 
Franks and Mayer (1996), which showed on a sample of 33 successful hostile takeovers in 
the UK, that 90% of the target executives have resigned after completion of the deal.
11
 
A vast body of literature has been dedicated to explain the changes in corporate control as 
a result of hostile bids and the disciplinary factor of these takeovers.   
“When a firm’s internal mechanisms that govern management control are relatively weak, 
the corporate takeover market seems to act as a “court of last resort” to discipline 
inappropriate management behaviour.”12  
Hence, the disciplinary feature of hostile takeovers can not only remove and replace 
underperforming management, but it can encourage the management of other companies to 
perform according to their shareholders’ interest. Furthermore hostile takeovers can 
contribute to the re-allocation of performing assets away from declining sectors and into 
value maximizing uses.
13
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    2.2. Hostile takeover strategies 
 
In several hostile takeovers the acquirer initially tries to purchase less than 100% of the 
target company’s shares. There are two explanations for this approach. First, the acquirer 
might think, that it is not necessary to acquire all of the target’s outstanding shares in order 
to implement the changes, that would improve the company’s value. Second, some target 
shareholders might not agree to sell their shares at any price, fearing a takeover and the 
loss of their jobs.
14
 
There are several types of takeover strategies that can be deployed, among these the most 
important: the bear hug, the proxy contest and the hostile tender offer. 
When applying the bear hug the acquirer mails a letter to the target company’s board of 
directors followed by a public announcement demanding a rapid decision. The target 
board, who is legally obliged to follow its shareholders’ best interest, is put into difficulty 
and can even face a lawsuit from the target company’s shareholders, if the offer represents 
a substantial premium to the current stock price and the board members reject the proposal. 
The pressure on the board rises as institutional investors and arbitragers advocate the 
acceptance of the offer, betting on profits resulting from the rise of the target’s share price 
and simultaneous fall of the attackers share price.
15
 
The second takeover strategy, the proxy contest, can take three different forms. An 
acquirer uses the shareholder’s proxy votes to change the board of directors or it can 
pursue a change in the company’s bylaws. Furthermore proxy contests can refer to certain 
management proposals (e.g. an acquisition). Faleye (2004) shows that proxy contests are 
usually initiated by dissident shareholders in order to remove poorly performing 
management, to support the restructuring or the outright sale of the company or to enforce 
the pay-out of dividends to shareholders. As a result of the changes of terms, of how the 
company is being managed, proxy fights lead to positive abnormal returns to the target 
company’s shareholders.16 
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 Grinblatt and Titman (2002), p. 735 
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A hostile tender offer involves the direct approach of the target company’s shareholders 
and the offer to purchase their shares without the notification of the target’s board and 
management. The tender offer can take the form of cash, stock, debt or a combination of 
the three. The acquirer can also choose to make a pre-tender offer, also known as a 
toehold, by secretly purchasing stock in the target company at a lower price than the actual 
offer price.
17
 
Once an acquirer decides to present a tender offer to the target shareholders, it can opt for a 
one-tiered or a two-tiered offer.  When presenting a one-tiered offer the acquirer makes the 
same offer to all the shareholders, facilitating a quick gain of control over the target and 
discouraging other potential bidders from interfering with the transaction. On the other 
hand during a two-tiered offer the acquirer offers to buy a certain amount of shares in the 
target at one price and more share at a later date at a lower price. The rationale behind this 
approach is to incentivize the shareholders to tender their shares at an early stage of the 
process to receive an attractive price. Moreover, the shares which enable the acquirer to 
gain a controlling interest in the target are more valuable than those purchased at a later 
stage during the second tier.
18
 
The effects on target shareholders’ wealth of proxy contests and tender offers are 
documented by Jensen and Ruback (1983) who find that “stockholders in companies that 
experience proxy contests earn statistically significant average abnormal returns of about 
8 per cent” and “these returns are not substantially lower when the insurgent group loses 
the contest.”19 On the other hand “target firms in successful takeovers experience 
statistically significant abnormal stock price changes of […] 30% in tender offers” and a 
3% abnormal price loss when the takeover was unsuccessful.
20
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2.3. Hostile activity during the takeover waves 
 
So far academic literature has defined five completed merger waves: those of the early 
1900s, the 1920s, the 1960s, the 1980s and the 1990s. Studies of these waves have shown 
that takeovers usually coincide with periods of economic recovery, characterized by rapid 
credit expansion accompanied by stock market booms and are disrupted by periods of 
economic recession and steep declines of the stock market. Furthermore takeover activity 
can be triggered by regulatory changes, industrial and technological shocks but also by 
managers’ personal motivation. Several studies tend to differentiate between five well 
documented American takeover waves, three UK waves, with reliable evidence being 
available from the early 1960s and two European waves, starting from the beginning of the 
1980s.
21
  
The main feature of the first three waves was consolidation, which lead to the creation of a 
large number of giant companies. All three waves came to an end following a stock market 
crash and economic recession triggered by the First and Second World War and the oil 
crisis at the beginning of the 1970s.
22
 
The large conglomerates formed in these years proved to be inefficient by the 1980s and as 
a consequence companies saw the need to reorganize their businesses. New financial 
instruments (e.g. junk bonds), changes of antitrust policies, the deregulation of financial 
services as well as the increased technological progress created an optimal environment for 
a record number of hostile takeovers, divestitures and leveraged buyouts.
23
 
The fifth wave was a truly global phenomenon reflecting the increase in capital market 
globalization. While in the UK and US the number of hostile takeovers fell significantly in 
contrast to the wave of the 1980s, Continental Europe saw an increase in hostile activity. 
The decrease of hostile takeovers in the UK and US can be attributed to the bull market, 
with target shareholders being more willing to accept a takeover bid as their shares were 
overpriced. Martynova and Renneboog attribute the lack of hostile takeovers in the 1980s 
to the concentrated ownership structure of Continental European companies, which made 
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 Martynova and Renneboog (2008), p. 2152 
22
 Martynova and Renneboog (2008), p. 2149 
23
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the takeover of such companies even more difficult. The increased IPO activity, 
deregulation and privatization, tax reforms and increased disclosure requirements in the 
1990s reduced the control measures and the ownership structure complexity, exposing 
companies in Europe to more hostility. The fifth wave ended as a consequence of the 
equity market collapse in 2000.
24
 
The gradual recovery of the economic and financial markets after the early 2000s 
downturn generated by the burst of the dot-com bubble, have triggered the M&A markets, 
which have seen a steady increase in the number of deals and in volume. Following the 
trend of participating in the globalized markets, cross-border acquisitions in the period 
2001 until mid-2005 accounted for more than 43% of the total value of all European M&A 
deals and 13% of the total US deals.
25
 
After this period of boom the 2007 US subprime crisis brought everything to a sudden halt 
as economic growth lost momentum, falling stock prices and limited credit availability 
lead to a significant slowdown in M&A activity. As the panic provoked by the crisis began 
to fade away and markets were recovering, hostile takeover activity started increasing. 
The austerity measures of several companies during the crisis combined with low stock 
prices, decreasing company valuations and low interest rates, exposed weakened 
companies to the raids of highly liquid corporations with a strong capital basis and efficient 
operations. Another reason for the surge of hostile takeover activity can be found in the 
abandoning of anti-takeover provisions. A study by Stendevad, Shivdasani and 
Kimyagarov (2009) showed that in 2002 60% of all S&P
26
 500 companies had poison pills 
or staggered boards included in their corporate statute, in contrast by mid2009 only 19% of 
the companies applied the poison pill and 30% the staggered board.
27
 Following some 
high-profile deals like Kraft and Cadbury, Porsche and Volkswagen, Rio Tinto and BHP 
Billiton political debate started dealing with the regulation of hostile takeovers, demanding 
more shareholder rights and increased management accountability.
28
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Rauch and Wahrenburg (2011) conclude: 
“Should the planned regulatory changes be implemented, markets might also 
experience different or previously unknown hostile takeover strategies and defences 
as a reaction to these changes. […] The future of hostile takeovers will remain an 
exciting playing field for corporations and their advisors, as well as for researchers 
trying to understand the inner workings of hostile M&A transactions.”29  
 
3. Hostile takeover defence mechanisms 
 
Companies apply defences against hostile takeovers in order to protect their independence 
and current business policies but also to exert pressure on hostile bidders in order to attain 
a higher offer. After outlining the possible motivation behind defence mechanisms, the 
current chapter reviews several hostile takeover defence tactics, dividing these into 
preventive and remedial strategies and drawing upon their effectiveness in fending off 
unwanted suitors as well as their impact on shareholders’ wealth. Finally, in the light of the 
Kraft Foods Cadbury takeover I present the limitations of the application of certain defence 
mechanisms for companies in the UK imposed by the City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers versus their treatment under Delaware Law in the US. 
 
    3.1. Motivation behind defence mechanisms 
 
Several theories have tried to explain why a target company’s executives might resist a 
takeover attempt. Two alternative views have emerged, given that a successful takeover 
can lead to a significant takeover premium for the target’s shareholders while representing 
at the same time a threat for the executives’ tenure.30 
The “management entrenchment” theory argues that defence mechanisms are “primarily 
self-serving devices” applied by target executives to protect their position by trying to fend 
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 Rauch and Wahrenburg (2011), p. 355 
30
 DePamphilis (2011), p. 98 
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off a takeover approach.  As the freedom of shareholders to accept a takeover without the 
executives’ interference is viewed as an “important element of a well-functioning system of 
corporate governance”, takeover defences can work against the shareholder’s best interest 
by “obstructing the market for corporate control.” 
On the other hand Bebchuk (1982) argues that in the light of the market of corporate 
control, the target executives can put effort to maximize returns for their shareholders. The 
“shareholder interest” theory depicts that the defence mechanisms employed by executives, 
will raise the takeover premium and consequently maximize the price paid for the target, 
thereby serving the shareholder’s best interest. 31 
Considering the aforementioned theories the following section analyses the most important 
and commonly employed anti-takeover defence strategies classifying these into two 
categories: preventive and remedial anti-takeover strategies. 
 
 
    3.2. Preventive anti-takeover strategies 
 
Preventive defence strategies are used prior to an actual attack, when management suspects 
that the company might be vulnerable to a raider’s attack as a result of its low stock price, 
market conditions or financial tightening. Committing to defend the company against 
possible future takeover attacks signals that the management is willing to protect and 
preserve the company’s autonomy, although these measures do not necessarily have the 
power to block a takeover. Nonetheless they can make a takeover more costly and difficult.  
Clarke and Brennan (1990) argue that “the strongest pre-bid defence is for the incumbent 
management team to pursue corporate strategies that will maximise shareholder value, 
thereby reducing the incentive for any change in control.”32 
The most commonly applied preventive anti-takeover strategies and the impact of their use 
are discussed below. 
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        3.2.1. Poison pills 
 
A poison pill is a defence mechanism by which the target shareholders are offered the right 
to acquire preferred stock in the company at a discount to their fair market price. The 
rationale behind the adoption of this strategy is “to dilute the stock so much that the 
attacking firm loses money on its investment.”33  
We can differentiate between two types of poison pills: the poison pill with flip-over rights 
and the flip-in poison pill. The first type gives existing shareholder the right to buy 
preferred stock after the acquisition of the company at a deep discount. The downside of 
using flip-over rights is that these are only applicable if the acquirer buys 100% of the 
target company. Thus, such a poison pill cannot prevent an unwelcome aggressor from 
gaining control over the company but it can very well block a full acquisition. In contrast, a 
flip-in poison pill allows stockholders to acquire additional shares in the target company at 
a discounted price in order to prevent a potential raider from taking control of the 
corporation. 
34
 
 
 
        3.2.2. Golden parachutes 
 
Golden parachutes are highly attractive compensation packages, usually lump-sum 
payment arrangements, which are offered to senior management in case of a forced change 
of control as a result of a takeover bid. Thus, if a certain threshold of stock ownership in 
the target company is reached, the executives entitled of the golden parachute are free to 
end their contract and will receive the monetary compensation.
35
 Faced with a hostile 
takeover and with the risk of losing their jobs, executives are likely to block the offers even 
if the bids have a significant positive impact on shareholders’ wealth. Walkling and Long 
(1994) find that the probability of executives blocking a takeover bid is directly linked to 
the takeover’s impact on their personal wealth.  
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Golden parachutes “are intended to help executives resist takeover attempts that endanger 
their jobs by aligning their wealth more closely with shareholders’ interest. Their worth is 
commonly based on the executive’s seniority, position, salary, and number of years of 
service with the firm.” 36 
 
 
        3.2.3. Staggered board and supermajority rules 
 
A staggered board involves the election of the board members periodically and not during 
the same year. The logic behind this anti-takeover measure is to thwart hostile takeover 
attempts by preventing a raider from electing a completely new board to facilitate the 
transition process after the takeover.
37
  
Empirical studies by Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002) show that on the sample 
examined between 1996 and 2000, not a single hostile takeover of a company having the 
staggered board in its bylaws was successful. Despite of its effectiveness of fending off 
hostile takeover attempts, staggered boards have become disputable, with shareholder 
activists demanding the companies to de-stagger their boards. Not only can staggered 
boards serve as a management entrenchment mechanism by not allowing the change of 
inefficient board members after a hostile takeover, but empirical studies also report 
negative effects on shareholder wealth. This argument is supported by an empirical study 
of Bebchuk et al (2002) stating that after a hostile takeover, corporations with staggered 
boards show a lower increase of their stock price than corporations without (31.8% vs. 
43.4%).
38
 
Another tactic to impede a raider from gaining control over a target company is to adopt 
supermajority rules. Thereby the control over a company is not necessarily obtained by 
acquiring more than 50% of its stock but is conditioned by the approval of at least two 
thirds and sometimes even 90% of the shareholders’ votes.39  
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    3.3. Remedial anti-takeover strategies 
 
Remedial defence mechanisms are applied on or after the announcement of a takeover 
offer. Many companies choose not to adopt permanent defence mechanisms, in order not to 
signal retention to a possible takeover that could maximize shareholders’ wealth. These 
companies see themselves exposed to unwanted raiders and have to adopt last-minute 
measures to fend off undesired takeovers.
40
 Although post-bid defences are able to 
successfully fend off takeover attempts, they can also destroy shareholder wealth. “If the 
economic value of the target is decreased to make it less attractive for an acquirer, target 
shareholders will suffer accordingly due to the decrease in share value.”41 
The most frequently used remedial anti-takeover defence mechanisms as well as the effects 
of their application are highlighted below. 
 
 
        3.3.1. “Scorched-earth” or “Jonestown” strategies 
 
The role of “scorched-earth” or “Jonestown” defences is the “economic destruction of the 
target company through its management.” Their purpose is to make the target company as 
unattractive as possible to the acquirer by selling off important assets, firing employees and 
stripping the company of its cash. Different strategies can be deployed to reach this goal, 
however the most commonly applied are the sale of “crown jewels” and the “suicide pill”. 
One of the most radical strategies, which leads to an immediate value destruction of the 
company, is the sale of “crown jewels”. It involves the sale of the target company’s most 
profitable assets or the assets that the acquirer values most, in order to decrease the 
attractiveness of the company, but at the same time implicitly destroys also shareholder 
value. When the sale of “crown jewels” is accompanied by the firing of key employees 
and/or stripping the target company of its cash, the company is applying the “suicide pill”. 
As a result of these tactics shareholders lose not only their expected takeover premium but 
also their stock value before the takeover offer.
42
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        3.3.2. White Knights 
 
When target management wants to oppose a hostile bidder becoming the majority 
shareholder of the company, its board can ask a third friendly company, a “white knight”, 
to rescue it by acquiring a majority share of stock in the target company. On the other hand 
the company can also ask a “white squire” to buy a block in the target’s stock instead of 
purchasing a majority interest, thereby blocking a possible raider from gaining control over 
the company.
43
 
Consequently the white knight or white squire acquires the shares on more favourable 
terms than those of the attacker, which doesn’t necessarily mean that it has to pay a better 
price, but by allowing the target’s management to remain unchanged and following the 
company’s corporate strategy. In order to protect itself from a possible bidding war, the 
white knight can demand some warranty, which can take the form of options to buy 
unissued stock or certain assets of the target company in the future at a fixed price.
44
. 
 
 
        3.3.3. Greenmail  
 
When the aggressor is not a strategic investor, looking only to make a short-term profit, the 
target’s management can offer the raider to repurchase the shares of stock that it has 
acquired at a premium, provided that he refrains from targeting the company.  
Arguments regarding the legitimacy of this defence mechanism are contradictory. Some 
assert that the payment of a premium leads to overvalued shares of the company and that 
the cash used for the share repurchase should be rather dedicated to profitable projects 
which increase shareholder wealth. However, others argue that financial investors’, 
specifically private equity companies’ primary goal is to earn short-term profits for their 
investors through highly leveraged transactions, putting the target company under severe 
financial stress as the company’s free cash flow is used to repay the debt and consequently 
cannot be invested in profitable projects. The investment horizon is short, usually five to 
six years, after which the target is divided into different entities, which are then sold 
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separately. Nevertheless, considering the economic implication of this strategy and if long-
term evolution is preferred over short-term profits, the greenmail defence can be a good 
tactic for shareholders to fend off financial investors. 
45
 
 
 
        3.3.4. Standstill agreements 
 
A standstill agreement represents a contract between the target company and a raider, 
according to which the attacker agrees not to acquire any more stock in the target for a 
predefined period of time in exchange for a fee paid by the target company. In order to 
prevent the sale to another attacker, who wouldn’t respect the agreement, the contract 
usually includes a stipulation according to which the target company can refuse the resale 
of the stock acquired by the raider to another party. A study by Gaughan (1996) asserts that 
entering a standstill agreement, “which often signals the cessation of the takeover 
attempt”, results in a value decline for the target company’s shareholders, which “negates 
the price boost that follows the announcement of the takeover bid.”46 
 
 
        3.3.5. Litigation 
 
Litigation “involves pursuing a legal injunction and restraining order” against an attacker 
in order to block that company from acquiring more shares until the attacker can legally 
prove that the injunction is unjustified. While the attacker prepares its legal defence, it 
buys the target company more time to develop other takeover defence strategies or to 
solicit more attractive offers. The target company can file a suit against the attacker for 
violating antitrust laws by arguing that the combined company will violate antitrust laws, 
for inadequate disclosure, if the attacker fails to disclose information, or fraud, if the 
attacker “deliberately misrepresented facts for the purpose of depriving shareholders of 
their rights.” 47  
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        3.3.6. Capital structure changes 
 
Another effective anti-takeover method is the restructuring of the target company’s capital. 
The company has four main options: leveraged recapitalization, raising additional debt, 
issuing additional stock or repurchasing outstanding shares. 
By recapitalizing the target company is assuming substantial amounts of new debt which 
then in turn allocates to financing dividends for its shareholders. The equity on the target’s 
balance sheet is replaced by debt, reducing its borrowing capacity and making it less 
attractive for the aggressor. The target company can also recapitalize by buying back stock. 
Combined with an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)
48
 executives can not only 
increase the number of stock controlled by existing shareholders or insiders but it can also 
effectively thwart a hostile takeover.  
When the pay-out of large dividends from newly assumed debt is considered 
disadvantageous, the executives of the target company can simply add more debt to its 
balance sheet. The company can raise more debt by issuing bonds or by borrowing from 
external lenders and then make sure that the debt is kept on the balance sheet. This strategy 
is common for companies with low debt-to-asset ratios, as an aggressor could use the 
target’s own borrowing capacity to finance the takeover. 
Another method for restructuring the company’s capital is to issue additional shares. The 
target maintains its debt level and the takeover becomes more costly for the raider but at 
the same time it dilutes shareholders’ equity. When the company doesn’t want the raider to 
acquire the stock on the open market, it can choose to issue new shares to a white squire or 
the company’s own ESOP.49 
The forth strategy to fend off an aggressor is for the target to repurchase its own shares on 
the open market. There are fewer shares available for the raider and at the same time 
arbitragers, who want to make profits by betting on the differences between the takeover 
price and the actual price and help attackers by selling them their shares, are restrained 
from acquiring a controlling stake in the target company. As the firm uses its own 
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resources to repurchase outstanding shares, a cash rich company with low debt on its 
balance sheet can diminish the risk of being acquired.  Nevertheless the strategy can also 
have its downside. When a target company decides it wants to repurchase shares, an 
aggressor will have fewer shares to acquire in order to gain a controlling stake. 
50
 
Each of the four options has the ability to decrease the attractiveness of a target company. 
However their impact on shareholders’ wealth is inconclusive. As none of the strategies 
permanently change the perspectives of the target company’s competitiveness, they 
represent more “nuisance than barrier”.51 
 
 
    3.4. Hostile takeover defences under US vs. UK law 
 
The types of defence strategies and the way these may be adopted are very different under 
US law, namely under Delaware Law and the UK law, under The City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers (the “Code”). The Delaware law states that, when a target company’s 
executives perceive a hostile bid as a danger for corporate policy, “the board has both the 
power and the duty to interpose itself between the offeror and the shareholders and, where 
necessary, take defensive measures that are not disproportionate to the threat.”52  
In contrast the Code puts the shareholders interest in the centre, especially the interests of 
institutional investors. Prior or during the course of a takeover bid, the company’s board 
“must not, without the approval of the shareholders in general meeting, take action which 
may result in any offer or bona fide possible offer frustrated or in shareholders being 
denied the opportunity to decide on its merits.”53 Thus, the Code not only conditions the 
implementation of any defence mechanism to shareholders’ approval but also assigns them 
the right to decide whether they accept a takeover offer or not. Furthermore shareholder 
approval is needed prior to the issue of new shares or the transfer of shares to a bidder.
54
 
The Code not only determines the board’s neutrality and interdicts the installing of defence 
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mechanisms without shareholders’ approval, but also demands a mandatory bid for all 
shares, if a bidder has acquired over 30% of the target’s voting rights.55 
Empirical studies of takeovers in both the United States and the United Kingdom have 
shown that in the period 1990-2005, 0.85% of all announced takeovers in the UK were 
hostile as a contrast to 0.5% in the US. Of these hostile bids, 43% were successful in the 
UK and 24% in the US
56
, emphasizing that a takeover in the UK is more likely to be 
hostile and that the probability of the hostile takeover succeeding is higher than in the US. 
Given the legal differences between the US and UK jurisdictions, prohibition of partial and 
two-tier offers by the Code and the central role of shareholder protection, automatically 
eliminates several takeover defence mechanisms for target companies in the UK, e.g. the 
poison pill, supermajority rights, staggered board. In consequence the most frequently used 
defence tactics in the UK include: (I) the sale of crown jewels, (II) the recapitalization of 
the target’s capital structure, requiring shareholder approval, (III) “the issuance of a class 
of shares or convertible securities with either limited or supervoting rights”, (IV) the 
issuance of shares to a friendly third party, (V) the repurchase of shares, (VI) the board’s  
recommendation to the shareholders not to accept the takeover offer, (VII) the finding of a 
white knight.
57
  
Moreover Schönberg and Thornton (2004) find on sample of 56 publicly traded companies 
in the UK between 1995 and 1999, that the most commonly used defence mechanism 
employed during a hostile takeover was the release of profit forecasts, followed by the 
release of other financial information. Another popular defence mechanism applied was the 
white knight, which in 80% of the cases lead to the failure of a hostile bid.
58
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4. The takeover of Cadbury by Kraft Foods 
 
The current chapter focuses on the background and the process of Cadbury’s takeover by 
Kraft Foods. After outlining the profiles of the target and acquiring companies and 
presenting the trends and challenges in the global confectionery market in 2009, I highlight 
the motivation behind the takeover. Subsection 4.5. Event timeline of Cadbury’s takeover 
presents the course of events in Cadbury’s five month battle in the wake of Kraft’s hostile 
takeover offer. Drawing upon the anti-takeover defence mechanisms highlighted in the 
previous chapter, subsection 4.6. Deal announcement and Cadbury’s defence strategies 
presents the measures employed by Cadbury’s management in its strive for the company’s 
independence and how effective these were in maximizing shareholders’ wealth. 
 
 
    4.1. Background of Kraft Foods Inc. 
 
Kraft Foods Inc. has started as a small cheese business in Illinois and has developed over 
the course of a century into one of the world’s leading food companies. Today the 
company manufactures and markets packaged food products, including beverages, snacks, 
convenient meals, cheese and packaged grocery products, and before Cadbury’s takeover 
was the world’s second largest food company after Nestlé, with annual net revenues of 
approximately USD 42 billion. In 2009 Kraft Foods sold its products to customers in 
approximately 160 countries, having operations in more than 70 countries and 159 
manufacturing facilities around the globe. Headquartered in Northfield, Illinois the 
company had approximately 97,000 employees worldwide.  
As at December 31, 2009, Kraft’s portfolio included nine brands with annual net revenues 
exceeding USD 1 billion each and approximately 50 brands generating an annual revenue 
of over USD 100 million each. Some of its best known brands include: Kraft cheeses, 
dinners and dressings, Milka chocolates, Oreo cookies, Philadelphia cream cheese and 
Jacobs coffee.
59
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The company’s businesses are managed through two units: Kraft North America and Kraft 
International. Kraft North America operates in six major segments: U.S. Snacks (12% of 
revenues), U.S. Convenient Meals (11% of revenues), U.S. Cheese (9% of revenues), U.S. 
Grocery (9% of revenues), U.S. Beverages (8% of revenues) and Canada & North America 
Foodservice (10% of revenues). Kraft International is divided into two geographic 
segments: European Union, representing 22% of Kraft’s total revenues and Developing 
Markets, 20% of total revenues. 
Kraft Foods’ principal stock exchange on which its common stock is listed is the NYSE60. 
Berkshire Hathaway a multinational conglomerate holding company owned by Warren 
Buffet was the largest shareholder, holding 8.8% of Kraft’s common stock.61  
The table below highlights Kraft Foods’ key financials for the five years prior to Cadbury’s 
takeover: 
 
Table 1: Overview of Kraft Foods’ historical performance62 
 
In the years prior to Cadbury’s takeover Kraft has been heavily focusing on restructuring 
and developing its core business. Nevertheless the company has faced troubles from 2007 
and into 2009, as high inflation offset a large part of its restructuring savings and high 
pricing led to significant share and elasticity losses. 
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Key figures (in USDm) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Revenue 32,779 33,018 35,858 41,932 40,386
Growth (in %) 5.26% 0.73% 8.60% 16.94% -3.69%
Operating income 4,373 4,158 4,176 3,843 5,524
Margin (in %) 13.3% 12.6% 11.6% 9.2% 13.7%
Net income 2,639 3,065 2,724 2,893 3,028
Margin (in %) 8.05% 9.28% 7.60% 6.90% 7.50%
Total assets 57,597 55,548 68,132 63,173 66,714
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    4.2. Background of Cadbury Plc. 
 
Cadbury, a British company with a history of almost 200 years, started as a chocolate shop 
in England in 1824 and has expanded its business through organic growth and acquisitions, 
to become the world’s second largest confectionery company with a global market share of 
over 10%. Its portfolio comprised well known chocolate, candy and gum brands like 
Cadbury Dairy Milk, Halls and Trident. Before its takeover Cadbury employed 
approximately 45,000 people around the world and had operations in over 60 countries 
globally. Furthermore the company held leadership positions in over 20 countries of the 
world’s top confectionery markets. Trident, the largest gum brand in the world and a 7% 
growth over the last four years in the gum segment, made gum the fastest growing segment 
in confectionery, placing Cadbury on the second position in the global gum market. 
Moreover its candy brand, Halls, was the largest in the world, accounting for more than 
one-third of Cadbury’s candy revenues.63 
With an average growth of 12% over five years, Cadbury had the largest and most broadly 
spread emerging markets portfolio of all confectionery companies
64
, these markets 
accounting for over one third of the company’s revenues and 60% of its revenue growth. 65 
In June 2007 Cadbury had introduced the implementation of its Vision into Action (VIA) 
business plan for the years 2008-2011, setting its primary goal to become “the world’s 
biggest and best confectionery company” and deliver superior shareholder returns. The 
business plan was built on three pillars which comprised the main focus and priorities of 
the company’s strategy: 
 Growth: Driven by the policy “Fewer, Faster, Bigger, Better”, Cadbury’s priority 
was “category and geographic focus as a means of providing scale and 
simplicity”, focus on its biggest and strongest brands, “integrating and deriving full 
benefit from recent acquisitions in Turkey, Romania and Japan.” 
 Efficiency: The cost reduction and efficiency programme targeted the company’s 
sales, general and administration costs as well as its supply chain across the global 
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operations with the aim of improving operating profit margins […] to mid-teens by 
2011.” 
 Capabilities: The third pillar describes Cadbury’s commitment to continue to 
invest “in capabilities to support our [Cadbury’s] people to deliver on our 
[Cadbury’s] growth and efficiency priorities.”66 
The business plan envisaged six financial targets to be achieved by 2011: (I) organic 
revenue growth of 4-6% year-over-year, (II) mid-teens profit margins, (III) overall gain of 
confectionery share, (IV) increased dividend growth, (V) growth in return on invested 
capital and (VI) an efficient balance sheet.  
Despite the Vision into Action business plan, Cadbury’s shares were flagging in the 
market. This was caused by several factors, including the drop of asset and equity 
valuations on the global level, the scepticism regarding management’s ability to reach the 
targeted figures and a number of past events, like product recalls in the UK, accounting 
issues related to Cadbury’s business in Nigeria and a case of salmonella contamination. 
After delivering over 70% of the expected margin improvements, a significant reduction of 
selling, general and administrative costs in 2008 and 2009, but also as a response to Kraft’s 
hostile takeover offer, Cadbury raised its organic revenue targets to 5-7% per year and 
operating profit margins to 16-18% by 2013.
67
 
The following table gives an overview of Cadbury’s consolidated past performance. 
 
Table 2: Overview of Cadbury’s historical performance68 
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 Cadbury (2009, 2008, 2007,2006,2005) 
Key figures (in GBPm) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Revenue 6,432 7,427 7,971 5,384 5,975
Growth (in %) 6.99% 15.47% 7.32% 14.58% 10.98%
Operating income 1,025 1,073 1,050 638 808
Margin (in %) 15.94% 14.45% 13.17% 11.85% 13.52%
Net income 707 650 632 487 519
Margin (in %) 10.99% 8.75% 7.93% 9.05% 8.69%
Total assets 10,992 10,223 11,338 8,895 8,129
23 
 
The significant drop in Cadbury’s earnings and total assets in 2008 is due to the de-merger 
of the company’s Americas Beverages business completed in May 2008 as part of 
Cadbury’s strategy to become a pure-play confectionery business. The growth in revenues 
for the year 2008 was calculated based on the re-presented revenues in 2007 of GBP 4,699. 
 
 
    4.3. The confectionery market in 2009 
 
After the 2007/2008 food price crisis and a short recovery during the second half of 2008 
due to the financial turmoil, agricultural commodity prices started soaring again in 2009, 
with commodities like tea, cocoa and coffee experiencing their highest trading levels for 30 
years.
69
 Macroeconomic factors such as low interest rates, volatile oil prices and exchange 
rates, the increased demand for biofuels but also the increasing speculative investment 
activity in agricultural commodities were the drivers for the spike in commodity prices, 
affecting the majority of the input costs of confectionery companies.
70
 As major purchasers 
of commodities (cocoa, wheat, coffee, nuts, corn products, vegetable oils, sugar, etc.) but 
also of plastic, glass and other materials used for product packaging, confectionery 
companies are highly exposed to the price volatility of these commodities, which in turn 
affect revenues and profitability. As a result many food and drink companies have started 
applying different measures to minimize the impact of the rising commodity prices, by 
passing on the price increase to consumers, looking for alternative raw materials to 
substitute costly commodities, reducing product weight without any price adjustment or by 
using exchange traded derivatives for hedging purposes against price risk of 
commodities.
71
 
The increase in costs and the continuing financial crisis called for diversification and 
consolidation in the confectionery industry. Complementary sectors, niche markets and 
expansion in emerging markets with huge growth potential caught the attention of large 
players in the confectionery business. The acquisition of Wrigley, the chewing gum 
company by food giant, Mars, in 2008 for a total consideration of USD 23 billion created 
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the world’s largest confectionery company. The increased competitor concentration put 
pressure on several players in the market seeking to improve their margins and 
profitability. 
Furthermore retail customers of confectionery companies such as supermarkets, food 
distributors and warehouses have continued to consolidate their operations, producing 
“large, sophisticated customers with increasing buying power”, who demand lower 
pricing, tailored products and enhanced product promotion. On the other hand 
confectionery companies saw themselves faced with an increasing competition of retailer 
brands. As a result of the financial crisis and the economic uncertainty many customers 
turned their attention towards retailer brands offered at discounted prices. 
72
 
The uncertain global economic outlook, the slowing growth in both developed and 
emerging markets, increasing unemployment which weighs heavily on consumer spending,   
the increased competitor concentration and high commodity prices, made confectionery 
players rethink their strategies and take pro-active measures to counter the faced 
challenges.  
 
 
    4.4. Rationale behind Cadbury’s takeover 
 
In its official takeover offer letter dated 9
th
 of November 2009 Kraft Foods summarizes the 
reasons for the offer in accordance with its long-term strategy as follows: 
“Kraft Foods believes that a combination with Cadbury would build on a global 
powerhouse in snacks, confectionery and quick meals, with an exceptional portfolio of 
leading brands around the world.” 
The combination with Cadbury brings several strategic opportunities for Kraft:  
 Market share: The combination of the two companies would create a global 
confectionery leader, “with a portfolio including more than 40 confectionery 
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brands, each with sales in excess of USD 100 million”, surpassing its competitors 
Mars and Nestlé.  
 
 
Figure 1: Global market share in the confectionery sector
73
  
 
Thus, the combined company would become number one in the chocolate and 
sugar confectionery segments and number two in the gum segment. Snack products 
will vault from 37% to almost half of Kraft’s sales transforming its products 
portfolio and bringing the company in a global snack product leadership position. 
 
 
Figure 2: Kraft Foods’ portfolio transformation74 
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 Geographical footprint: Cadbury’s geographic presence is complementary to that 
of Kraft Foods. Acquiring Cadbury gives Kraft a meaningful entry into faster 
growing markets like India and South Africa, where Cadbury is particularly strong 
and would consolidate its position in South America.
75
 As Cadbury has 40% of 
sales in developing countries, Kraft’s percentage of sales in these regions would 
increase from roughly 20% to 25% through the addition of Cadbury. The sales 
contribution in Europe would see a moderate increase to 24% from 22%, primarily 
due to Cadbury’s strength in England and Ireland. 
 
 
            Figure 3: Kraft Foods’ geographical presence pre- vs. post-takeover76 
 
 Distribution density: Cadbury has a strong position in “instant consumption 
channels, which have become increasingly important in both developed and 
developing countries.” Whereas Kraft is strong positioned in the grocery channel in 
North America and Western Europe. “A combination provides an enhanced 
platform […] to distribute both Cadbury’s and Kraft Foods’ products through both 
channels and creates an attractive opportunity for higher growth and margins.” 
Furthermore acquiring Cadbury would increase Kraft’s exposure to Western 
Europe, where Kraft would be able to use Cadbury’s distribution channels to 
improve margins and profitability in the region. 
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 Revenue synergies and cost savings: According to Kraft “there is a significant 
opportunity to realize pre-tax cost savings of at least USD 625 million annually”, 
resulting from operational, administrative, marketing and selling cost savings. The 
USD 625 million can be broken down into USD 300 million of operational 
synergies (manufacturing, procurement, R&D, logistics, customer care), USD 200 
million general and administrative synergies mainly through the elimination of 
redundant facilities and roles and USD 125 million of marketing and selling 
synergies. The expected revenue synergies and cost savings will drive long-term 
growth rates leading to estimated total revenues of approximately USD 50 billion 
per year. 
 Consolidation and economies of scale: A combination of Cadbury and Kraft 
Foods would provide the necessary scale for even more effective competition in the 
confectionery system, as “confectionery markets are consolidating and scale is 
becoming increasingly important, in part due to retailers’ increasing bargaining 
power, control of the supply chain and growing portfolio of their own retailer 
brands, which benefits from the global economic climate.”77 
Cadbury is a highly attractive asset being the world’s largest confectionery company with 
an impressive portfolio of market-leading global and local brands, with consistent sales 
growth over time and an attractive regional split. The combination of the two companies 
makes strategic sense due to their complementary nature and the expected revenue 
synergies and costs savings. 
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    4.5. Event timeline of Cadbury’s takeover 
 
The following section gives an illustrated timeline as well as a more detailed view of the 
key events during the five month battle for Cadbury’s independence. 
 
 
 
    Figure 4: Cadbury takeover event timeline 
 
Aug. 28, 2009: Irene Rosenfeld, CEO of Kraft Foods met Cadbury’s chairman, Roger Carr 
to present a proposal to combine the two companies. The offer was structured as follows: 
300 pence in cash and 0.2589 new Kraft shares for each Cadbury share, valuing Cadbury’s 
share at GBP 7.55. Cadbury’s board of directors rejected the offer in a letter stating that 
“the proposal is unsolicited, unattractive and fundamentally undervalues Cadbury.”  
Sept. 7, 2009: The bid is made public, leaving the terms unchanged but the offer dropped 
to GBP 7.45 per share (with a closing price of USD 28.10 per Kraft share price on 
September 4
th
 2009 and an exchange rate of 1.6346 $/£), resulting in a valuation of GBP 
10.2 billion for Cadbury’s issued share capital.78  
Sept. 12, 2009: In a letter to Irene Rosenfeld, Roger Carr rejects Kraft’s offer, emphasizing 
the wish of Cadbury staying an independent company and pointing out that under Kraft’s 
                                                 
 
78
 Kraft Foods Corporate/Financial News Release (07.09.2009) 
09 Nov. 2009
Official hostile 
takeover offer: £11.6bn 
02 Feb. 2010
Cadbury shareholders 
accept final offer 
19 Jan. 2010
Kraft launches final 
offer: £13.3bn
07 Sep. 2009
Kraft offer of £10.2 bn 
for Cadbury is made 
public
12 Sep. 2009
Cadbury REJECTS 
Kraft‘s offer
14 Dec. 2009
Cadbury issues defence 
document and 
REJECTS the offer
18 Nov. 2009
Hershey and Ferrero  
could make an offer for 
Cadbury
30 Sep. 2009
U.K. Takeover Panel 
sets „put up or shut up“ 
deadline for Kraft
29 
 
proposal, “Cadbury would be absorbed into Kraft’s low growth, conglomerate business 
model, an unappealing prospect which contrast sharply with our [Cadbury’s] strategy to 
be a pure play confectionery company.” 
Sept. 22, 2009: Cadbury approaches the UK Takeover Panel asking the regulator to set a 
deadline for Kraft to place a formal bid for Cadbury’s shares or walk away for six months. 
Sept. 23, 2009: Cadbury Chief Executive, Todd Stitzer, states at a Bank of 
America/Merrill Lynch conference that he acknowledges the strategic sense of the 
proposed deal and the expected revenue synergies but based on comparable transactions 
sees the fair value of Cadbury at 15 times EBITDA
79
. This would imply a valuation of 
GBP 9.00 per share and a total company value of GBP 12.2 billion.
80
  
Sept. 25, 2009: Cadbury brings a clarification regarding the press commentary on Todd 
Stitzer’s statements at the aforementioned conference, stating that the CEO’s remarks have 
been misinterpreted and that Stitzer “does not believe that Kraft’s proposal makes 
strategic or financial sense for Cadbury.”81 
Sept. 30, 2009: The UK Takeover Panel announces that Kraft has until 9 November 2009, 
5.00 p.m. to place an official offer for Cadbury or walk away. In the case that Kraft doesn’t 
make an offer it has to retreat for six months starting from the date of the announcement.
82
 
Oct. 21, 2009: Cadbury releases its third quarter results, showing a 7% revenue growth in 
the chocolate sector, 4% in gum, 11% in candy, an excellent growth in England and Ireland 
of 10% as well as in emerging markets, 18% in South America and 14% in Asia and the 
Middle East.
83
 
Nov. 9, 2009: Kraft launches its official hostile bid for Cadbury. The offer remained 
unchanged, 300 pence in cash and 0.2589 new Kraft shares for each Cadbury share, 
valuing each Cadbury share at GBP 7.17, based on Kraft’s closing price of USD 26.78 on 
6 November 2009. This results in a total value of GBP 9.8 billion for Cadbury’s issued 
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shares, an EV multiple of 13.9 times Cadbury’s underlying EBITDA and an estimated EV 
of GBP 11.6 billion. Furthermore Kraft announces that it has secured a senior unsecured 
term loan facility with Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and HSBC in a total amount of GBP 5.5 
billion to finance the deal.  
The offer letter also highlights the substantial premium that the offer represents: 
 “37 per cent. over Cadbury’s share price of 524 pence on 3 July 2009, prior to 
analysts suggestion regarding potential sector consolidation; 
 29 per cent. over Cadbury’s 90-day average share price of 555 in the period up to 
4 September 2009, the last Business Day preceding the announcement by Kraft 
Foods of a possible offer for Cadbury; and 
 26 per cent. over Cadbury’s closing share price of 568 pence on September 2009, 
the last Business Day preceding the announcement by Kraft Foods of a possible 
offer for Cadbury.”84 
Roger Carr’s response to the offer: “The repetition of a proposal which is now of less value 
and lower than the current Cadbury share price does not make it any more attractive. As a 
result, the Board has emphatically rejected this derisory offer and has strengthened its 
resolve to ensure the true value of Cadbury is fully understood by all.”85 
Nov. 18, 2009: After increased speculation regarding a possible rival offer, Hershey and 
Ferrero announce that they are reviewing their options regarding a possible bid for 
Cadbury.
86
 
Dec. 14, 2009: Cadbury issues its defence document raising revenue growth and margin 
targets for the next four years and an update of the Vision into Action programme.
87
 
Jan. 5, 2010: Kraft announces the sale of its North American pizza business to Nestlé. The 
full net proceeds from the deal, USD 3.7 billion will be used to sweeten the cash portion of 
the Cadbury offer by 60 pence per share but at the same time cuts back the stock portion of 
the offer.
88
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Jan. 12, 2010: Cadbury releases its last defence document and highlights the 2009 
outstanding financial performance, as “2009 performance is well ahead of market 
expectations, driven by strong growth in the fourth quarter and the savings generated by 
Cadbury's Vision into Action business plan.”89 
Jan. 19, 2010: The final takeover offer is published by Kraft, valuing each Cadbury share 
at GBP 8.40 (based on Kraft’s closing price of USD 29.58 on 15 January 2010 and a 
$/£ exchange rate of 1.63), with each Cadbury shareholder being entitled to 500 pence in 
cash and 0.1874 new Kraft shares. Additionally Cadbury shareholders will be entitled to a 
10 pence special dividend. The final offer values the company’s issued share capital at 
GBP 11.9 billion, the enterprise value at GBP 13.3 billion, representing 13 times 
Cadbury’s underlying EBITDA. In order to honor the share portion of the offer Kraft will 
issue 265 million new shares, representing 18% of Kraft’s existing share capital.  
After five months of resistance Cadbury’s board accepts the offer with the following 
statement: “We believe the offer represents good value for Cadbury shareholders and are 
pleased with the commitment that Kraft Foods has made to our heritage, values and people 
throughout the world. We will now work with the Kraft Foods' management to ensure the 
continued success and growth of the business for the benefit of our customers, consumers 
and employees.
90
 
Jan 20, 2010: Warren Buffett, Kraft’s largest shareholder tells American news channel, 
CNBC that he has doubts regarding the acquisition of Cadbury and feels it is a bad deal.
91
 
Jan. 25, 2010: Italian company, Ferrero, decides not to take part in the bid for Cadbury, 
only three days after Hershey announced in a press release its decision not to make an offer 
for Cadbury. 
Feb. 2, 2010: Kraft announces that after acquiring 71.73% of Cadbury’s outstanding shares, it 
is “pleased to announce that it has acquired control of Cadbury plc.”92 
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Feb. 5, 2010: Kraft receives acceptance of its offer of 75.41%, enabling it to cancel the trading 
and listing of Cadbury’s stock on the London Stock Exchange.93  
Mar. 2, 2010: Roger Carr, Chairman of Cadbury, Todd Stitzer, CEO and Andrew Bonfield, 
CFO announce their resignation. 
 
 
    4.6. Deal announcement and Cadbury’s defence strategies  
 
 
 
  Figure 5: Kraft Foods, Cadbury share price movements
94
  
 
The reaction in Cadbury’s share price on the public announcement of Kraft’s offer is in 
line with the empirical evidence showing that target companies earn significantly positive 
abnormal returns on the announcement of the takeover offer. Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
assert that on average target share prices increased from 16% to 36% around the date of a 
takeover announcement, while Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) report a substantial 
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increase of target returns during the 1980s to around 53%.
95
 The increase in Cadbury’s 
share price on 7 September, 2009, the day of the public announcement of Kraft’s takeover 
offer, represented 38%.  
While the evidence on target returns is unanimous across the conducted studies, the 
evidence on bidder returns is mixed. Jarrell and Paulson (1989) find that the returns for 
bidders around the announcement date of a tender offer decreased from a 5% gain in the 
1960s to a 1% loss in the 1980s.
96
 Kraft’s share price experienced a drop of almost 6% on 
the day after the offer was made public as Cadbury management promptly rejected the 
offer. 
As seen in the previous section, 3.4. Hostile takeover defences under US vs. UK law, given 
the importance of shareholder protection and the prohibition of two-tiered offers, several 
preventive anti-takeover measures like poison pills, supermajority rights and staggered 
boards are ruled out. As a consequence, none of these defence mechanisms can be found in 
Cadbury’s corporate by-laws,97 thus limiting the company’s options for defending itself 
when confronted with an unwanted bidder. 
In a first instance Cadbury’s management advised its shareholders not to tender their 
shares, emphasizing that the proposed deal “to exchange shares in a pure-play 
confectionery business for cash and shares in Kraft, a company with a considerably less 
focused business mix and historically lower growth”98, would destroy shareholder wealth.  
While Cadbury’s share price was climbing and Kraft still hasn’t stated its intentions clearly 
in a formal takeover offer, Cadbury approached the UK Takeover Panel, asking for a put 
up or shut up deadline, forcing Kraft to place an official offer or walk away from its 
proposal. As a reaction Cadbury’s share price increased by 2% in the days after Cadbury’s 
request. 
After Kraft’s official takeover offer on 9 November, 2009 and increased speculation 
mainly from arbitragers and hedge funds regarding the appearance of a white knight, 
Cadbury’s share price reached an all-time high of GBP 8.04 after Hershey and Ferrero 
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announced on 19 November, 2009 that they are reviewing their options for placing a 
counter offer for Cadbury. A combination with Hershey would have suited Cadbury’s 
board well, with Hershey a pure play confectionery company, who would have offered 
more cash, being a better fit. Cadbury’s board fueled speculation by reporting that it was in 
talks with Hershey over a possible rival bid, putting pressure on Kraft although no 
imminent threat of a counter offer was actually in place. Finally, both Hershey and Ferrero 
announced that they won’t place an offer for Cadbury, as they didn’t want to enter a 
bidding war with multinational Kraft, which would have also involved a substantial debt 
level needed to finance the deal. 
After the release of Cadbury’s excellent third quarter results, updated revenue and margin 
targets, management published its first official defence document in December 2009 
putting pressure on Kraft. The released document raised the company’s long-term 
performance targets and rejected Kraft’s offer, making an appeal to Cadbury’s 
shareholders to take no action as Kraft has fundamentally failed to recognize the value of 
the company and warning: “Don’t let Kraft steal your company.”99 Cadbury’s share price 
failed to react as doubts regarding the achievement of these targets, considering the 
persistent increase in cocoa prices, started rising. 
But not only Cadbury’s management was urging its shareholders to reject Kraft’s offer. 
Fearing their wages, work conditions and even their jobs Cadbury workers, members of the 
Unite union have launched a campaign calling on the shareholders to turn down Kraft’s 
offer and lobbying the Government to take action in order to block the bid. The immense 
public outcry, protests and high media coverage surrounding the battle of one of Britain’s 
most loved brands to stay independent in the wake of a hostile bid from a foreign 
company, caught also the attention of the British government. Although government 
intervention was not common in the UK, unless competition concerns arise, the British 
Government expressed its concern regarding any bid that puts short-term gains ahead of 
long-term commitment, with Lord Mandelson, a Labour party politician even warning: “If 
you think that you can come here and make a fast buck you will find that you face huge 
opposition from the local population and from the British government.”100 
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Cadbury’s final defence document on 12 January, 2009 came to underline again the 
company’s steady growth in revenues and margins for 2009, sketching a promising outlook 
for 2010 and promising shareholders a substantial dividend increase as management 
repeatedly raised the plea not to accept Kraft’s offer. As a response Cadbury’s share price 
increased during the following days reaching its highest level of GBP 8.26 on 19 January, 
2009, the day when Kraft published its final offer, sweetening the deal to 500 pence in 
cash, 0.1874 new Kraft shares and a special dividend of 10 pence for each Cadbury share, 
valuing the company’s shares at GBP 8.50. Cadbury’s board recommended the deal to its 
shareholders, thus ending a five month battle over almost 200 years of the confectioner’s 
independence. 
The lack of preventive anti-takeover defence mechanism, the low share price, attractive 
brands with a widespread emerging market portfolio and pure play confectionery nature of 
Cadbury’s business, especially after the demerger of its Americas Beverages business, 
made Cadbury an appealing target. In line with Schönberg and Thornton (2004), who find 
that the most commonly employed defence mechanism for UK traded companies when 
confronted with a hostile takeover is the release of profit forecasts and the finding of a 
white knight, these were also the two main mechanisms used by Cadbury’s management in 
their attempt to fend off Kraft’s unwanted bid.  
But was the purpose of Cadbury’s management actually the prevention of the takeover or 
was its ultimate goal securing shareholder value, by getting a better price? None of the 
management’s employed measures had actually the power to fend off Kraft’s bid. 
Corporate communication played indeed an important role in Cadbury’s defence, the board 
being vocal about the lack of strategic sense of the deal, the outstanding performance of the 
company and its excellent outlook as an independent company, with Kraft fundamentally 
undervaluing Cadbury according to the company’s management. Nevertheless CEO 
Stitzer’s comment, although in hindsight catalogued as a misinterpretation through an 
official statement of the company, revealed the CEO’s true view on a possible takeover by 
Kraft, indirectly also naming his price expectation. Speculation regarding a possible rival 
offer by Hershey and Ferrero served Cadbury well, boosting its share price and putting 
pressure on Kraft to increase its offer even though no actual threat of a competing bid was 
in place. 
36 
 
Looking at management’s actions, the price movements in Cadbury’s stock and Kraft’s 
final offer one can conclude that if the ultimate goal was maximizing shareholder value, by 
getting a high price, this goal was definitely achieved. As chairman Carr states before his 
resignation: “Together we have fought an excellent defence campaign and delivered 
substantial value to Cadbury shareholders.”101 
 
 
 
5. Valuation: A theoretical framework 
 
The current chapter provides a theoretical framework for the calculation of Cadbury’s 
standalone equity value per share prior to Kraft’s takeover. The first part of the chapter 
lays out the theoretical foundation for the discounted cash flow analysis, highlights the 
calculation steps necessary to derive the equity value per share for the company while 
taking into consideration the valuation input variables relevant for Cadbury’s valuation. 
The relative valuation approach, which is meant to cross-check the results of the 
discounted cash flow analysis, is presented in the second part of the chapter.  
 
 
 
    5.1. The discounted cash flow method 
 
Perhaps the most commonly used method both by academics as well as by practitioners, 
the discounted cash flow valuation method derives the value of an asset as “the present 
value of the expected cash flow on the asset, discounted back at the rate that reflects the 
riskiness of these cash flows.”102 
With the ultimate goal of valuing the equity and thus the shares of a company one can 
choose between the enterprise valuation and the equity valuation. While enterprise 
valuation values the company’s operating cash flows by discounting these with the cost of 
capital, equity valuation values the claim of equity holders against the company’s 
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operating cash flow with the according cost of equity. Although when applied correctly, 
both methods should lead to the same result, the tendency is to use the enterprise valuation 
and thus value the company’s operations.103 
Koller et al (2005) define four main steps to derive the enterprise value and ultimately the 
value of the company’s common stock: 
 The company’s operations are valued by discounting the free cash flows with the 
weighted average cost of capital. 
 The company’s non-operating (“excess marketable securities, non-consolidated 
subsidiaries and other equity investments”) are valued and summed up to the value 
of operating assets to arrive to the enterprise value. 
 Non-equity financial claims, such as “fixed and floating-rate debt, pension 
shortfalls, employee options and preferred stock”, are identified and valued  
 The value of the company’s equity is computed by subtracting the non-financial 
claims from the enterprise value.
104
 
If done right, discounted cash flow valuation has a major advantage as it “requires 
analysts to understand the business that they are valuing and ask searching questions 
about the sustainability of cash flow and risk” by looking into the “fundamentals that 
drive value.” However as significantly more information is needed when applying the 
discounted cash flow method to estimate growth rates, cash flows and discount rates, a 
negligent approach in estimating these parameters can lead to value estimates that have 
“no relationship to intrinsic value.”105 
A structured approach for the completion of the valuation, which should ensure that the 
key decisions are considered at the right time during the valuation process, comprises the 
following steps: 
 
 
                                                 
 
103
 Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2005), p. 103 
104
 Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2005), p. 104 
105
 Damodaran (2006), p. 28 f 
38 
 
 
                 Figure 6: Six step structured approach for DCF valuation 
 
 
        5.1.1. Deriving the free cash flows 
 
In order to value the operations of a company we discount the free cash flows representing 
the company’s after-tax cash-flows, available for both equity and debt holders, by the 
according cost of capital, which reflects the operating risk of the company. As a contrast to 
the position “cash flow from operations” in the financial statement, the free cash flow is 
“independent of financing and nonoperating items”106 and can be thus referred to as the 
“unlevered” cash flow.107 Hence under the assumption of an all-equity financed company 
the free cash flows are derived by accounting for the cash flows that stem directly from the 
company’s operations and which should not be affected by any financing cash flows 
involving any debt or equity issuance, dividend or interest payments.
108
 
The starting point for deriving the free cash flows is the operating income of the company, 
defined as revenues less operating expenses. However the accounting measures for 
earnings can be misleading if operating, capital and financial expenses are misclassified. 
One of the most common mistakes involves the classification of R&D expenses which 
represent capital expenses, as operating expenses. In order to correct for this 
misclassification R&D expenses need to be capitalized. Another adjustment that needs to 
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be carried out is for financing expenses, such as operating leases, that are treated as 
operating expenses in the income statement.
109
 
As a company needs to reinvest in order to keep its operating income growing, the free 
cash flow to the firm is calculated after reinvestment needs. The two components used to 
derive reinvestment are discussed below: 
 Net capital expenditure: We arrive to the net capital expenditures by deducting 
depreciation from capital expenditure as the positive cash flow from depreciation 
accounts for a part of the capital expenditure, while it is only the surplus that 
diminishes the company’s free cash flow.110 Although information on capital 
expenditure and depreciation can be obtained easily from financial statements it is 
important to remember that it is not only internal investments that need to be 
considered when computing the capital expenditures, but also external investments 
representing acquisitions, whereat it doesn’t make a difference if these are funded 
with cash or with stock.
111
 
 Working capital: Under accounting rules working capital is defined as the 
difference between current assets and current liabilities. However for valuation 
purposes Damodaran suggests the use of non-cash working capital representing 
mainly accounts receivable and inventory, which implies two adjustments of the 
accounting definition of working capital. First cash and cash equivalents namely 
government treasury bills, commercial paper and other money market instruments 
which represent a riskless investment for which the company earns a “fair return” 
are excluded from current assets. Second, in order to avoid double counting, all 
interest bearing debt, meaning short-term debt and the part of long-term debt which 
is callable in the current period, needs to be deducted from current liabilities, as 
these will be included in the calculation of the cost of capital.
112
 
We derive the unlevered free cash flow of the company from EBIT using the following 
formula: 
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Figure 7: Deriving the unlevered free cash flow from EBIT
113
 
 
 
 
        5.1.2. Forecasting the free cash flows of the firm 
 
Perhaps the topic where academics and practitioners face the biggest uncertainty is when 
making assumptions about the future growth in earnings and cash flows of the company, 
since this has a significant impact on the result of the valuation. Damodaran defines three 
approaches for growth estimation: 
 Historical growth: Estimating future growth by looking at the company’s 
historical growth pattern can be a simple approach though it involves several 
measurement problems. The choice of computation plays an important role as the 
average historical growth rate can vary significantly depending on whether 
arithmetic or geometric average is used. When choosing the period of estimation 
one must bear in mind that the average growth rate can differ, depending on the 
starting and ending period of the estimation. Furthermore negative earnings can 
distort historical growth measures.
114
 But how useful is historical growth for 
estimating future growth? A study by Little (1960) finds that company’s reporting 
accelerated growth over a five-year period are not likely to exhibit the same growth 
rate over the next five-year period. Furthermore Damodaran examines growth rates 
in net income for US publicly traded companies over two consecutive five-year 
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periods and finds no persistence of sustained growth between the two different 
periods. 
115
 
 Management and analyst forecasts: Managers have the best knowledge about the 
inner-workings of their company and are the decision makers when it comes to 
future investment. Hence management forecasts should be more reliable than those 
published by outside followers of the company. However the danger of managers 
publishing biased forecasts arises as the company’s future outlook is a reflection of 
their own management skills and when management compensation is linked to the 
outperformance of certain future targets. Damodaran summarizes: “While 
managers draw on better information than other investors, when forecasting 
earnings and cash flows, the legal and competitive constraints that they work 
under, and the bias endemic in these forecasts reduces their value and predictive 
power.”116 Equity research analyst track publicly traded companies and make buy 
or sell recommendations for the companies’ stock based on their future growth 
estimates. Relying blindly on the consensus of analyst forecasts can be dangerous 
though as these are often derived based upon the companies’ historical data and 
sometimes ignore the changes in the fundamental characteristics of the company. 
Damodaran argues that “analyst estimates of earnings (and growth) have some 
predictive value for short-term earnings forecast, but are of little or any value for 
long-term growth forecasts.”117 
 Fundamental growth: While with historical and analyst estimates growth 
represents an exogenous variable, that impacts value but at the same time 
disregards the operating performance of the company, the most accurate way of 
determining growth is to look at its drivers. Since growth is ultimately driven by 
the inner workings of the company, it is a function of how much the company 
reinvests and the “quality of its reinvestment”. Damodaran suggests that earnings 
growth can be decomposed into two fundamentals. “Sustainable growth”, 
representing investments in new assets and “efficiency growth”, representing 
efficiency improvements on existing assets.
118
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We set up the equation for the enterprise valuation model, deriving the expected free cash 
flow to the firm as a function of sustainable and efficiency growth representing the 
reinvestment rate and the growth in after-tax operating income.  
 
              ∑
        
       
   
   
 
           
where,                                             
   = The cost of capital 
    = The free cash flow to the firm after taxes and reinvestment needs. 
The free cash flow can be written as a function of earnings, using the after-tax operating 
income, and the total reinvestment. 
                                                                         
 
The equation above becomes 
              ∑
                                          
                       
       
    
   
 
 
Where        represents the growth in after-tax operating income and the reinvestment rate is 
defined as 
                  
                                     
                         
 
When looking at operating income the expected growth is derived as the product of the 
reinvestment rate, namely the “proportion of the after-tax operating income that is 
invested in net capital expenditures and non-cash working capital, and the quality of these 
reinvestments, measured as the return on the capital invested.”119 
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Where, 
                  
                     
                
 
   
While growth is often determined without considering its implications, it is worth keeping 
in mind that “it is not growth, per se, that creates value but growth with positive excess 
returns. Higher growth can add value, destroy value or leave value unchanged.”120 
In other words, value is increased when a company is able to generate a return on capital 
that is higher than its cost of capital. 
The equations presented above will be used to derive the expected growth rate in operating 
income based on the future reinvestment rates and returns on capital and as a result the 
value of Cadbury Plc. 
 
 
        5.1.3. Choosing the tax rate 
 
When calculating the expected free cash flow of a company we are faced with the choice 
between effective tax rates and marginal tax rates. Damodaran proposes the use of 
marginal tax rates instead of the effective tax rate in order to eliminate the risk of making 
the false assumption that taxes can be deferred in perpetuity. Damodaran also suggests the 
use of effective tax rates in the reference year and the move towards the marginal tax rate 
in the forecast years.
121 
Dealing with multinational companies, the company’s income is taxed at different tax rates 
in the different countries of operation. Damodaran suggests three approaches when dealing 
with different tax rates: 
 Compute a weighted average of the different tax rates, by using the income from 
each country as weights. The problem arises if in time the income growth rate 
varies over the different countries, causing a change in the weights. 
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 Under the assumption that foreign income generated will be repatriated to the 
country where the company is incorporated, use the marginal tax rate of the 
company’s country of origin. 
 Differentiate between the incomes of each country of operation and apply the 
corresponding marginal tax rate.
122
 
Hence the tax rate applied for the reference year will be the effective tax rate, moving to 
the UK marginal tax rate for the forecast and calculation of Cadbury’s free cash flow to the 
firm. 
The marginal corporate tax rate in the UK levied on taxable income equaling or exceeding 
GBP 1.5 million amounts to 28%.
123
 
 
 
 
        5.1.4. Terminal value 
 
When valuing an asset that has a perpetual life we need to value the company’s expected 
cash flows beyond the explicit forecast period. In the context of DCF enterprise valuation 
this translates into the cash flow estimation over a pre-specified period and a terminal 
value at the end of the period.
124
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The most consistent approach of estimating the terminal value of a company is to assume 
that the free cash flows will grow at a constant rate into perpetuity. Using a perpetual 
growth model the present value of the company’s free cash flows in the terminal stage can 
be computed as follows: 
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       represents the free cash flow to the firm in the terminal year,    the weighted 
average cost of capital and         the constant growth rate expected to be sustained 
forever.
125
 
Since terminal value accounts for a large proportion of the total value of the company it is 
essential to make sensitive assumptions regarding the stable growth rate in perpetuity. One 
constraint regarding the level of the constant growth rate is that it cannot exceed the 
growth rate in the economy since no company can grow forever at a higher rate than the 
one in the economy. Furthermore in order to provide consistency the reinvestment rate 
should be linked to the expected stable growth rate. This can be accomplished by deriving 
the reinvestment rate as a function of the return on capital that the company is able to 
sustain in stable growth and the assumed stable growth rate, using the equations presented 
above.
126
 
 
 
        5.1.5. Cost of capital estimation 
 
When valuing a company using the DCF method, the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) is employed to discount the company’s free cash flow. Koller et al give the 
following definition for the weighted average cost of capital: “The weighted average cost 
of capital represents the opportunity cost that investors face for investing their funds in one 
particular business instead of others with similar risk.” Thus, the cost of capital has to 
include the return for both creditors and shareholders, as the free cash flow of the company 
is available to all financial investors. 
Three components are necessary to derive the cost of capital: the after-tax cost of debt, the 
cost of equity and the company’s target debt and equity values. As these variables are not 
directly observable, several approximations and assumptions have to be made.
127
 
Copeland et al define several criteria that have to be met in order to arrive to consistent 
results:
128
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 Since the free cash flows of the company are available for all investors, who bear 
the investment risk, all sources of funding including debt and equity need to be 
included. 
 To ensure consistency with the free cash flow calculation, the computation of the 
cost of capital needs to be carried out after tax. Consequently any tax shield from 
financing is included. 
 As market values reflect better the underlying claim for each financing type, market 
values have to be used instead of historical book values. 
The weighted average cost of capital including only two sources of financing, 
nonconvertible, non-callable debt and equity, is given by the following equation: 
     
 
 
            
 
 
     , where 
 
 
   =  The target debt level to enterprise value, using market values, where enterprise value 
is defined as D + E, 
 
 
   =  The target equity level to enterprise value, using market values 
   =  The pre-tax cost of debt 
   =  The cost of equity capital 
    =  The marginal income tax rate of the company 
Note that the equation has to be expanded if the company has other securities, e.g. 
preferred stock.
129
 
For simplicity practitioners usually discount the expected free cash flows with a single cost 
of capital, although the most accurate and theoretically correct method is to calculate 
different discount rates for each cash flow.
130
 
The following section describes the components of the weighted average cost of capital 
and the underlying assumptions leading to an estimation of these variables. 
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        5.1.6. Setting the capital structure 
 
In order to derive the capital structure of the company, which provides the weights for the 
cost of capital equation, market values are required. It is important to use a target capital 
structure than the company’s current capital structure for several reasons: 
 The current capital structure of the company might be a temporary financing 
decision which might not be the best indicator for the capital structure expected in 
the future 
 Changes in the market value of outstanding securities and management decisions to 
change the capital mix have an impact on capital structure 
 The purpose of the DCF valuation is the determination of the value of equity and to 
compute this value we discount the free cash flow by the cost of capital. However 
in order to determine the cost of capital, market values are needed, especially the 
market value of equity. This circularity dilemma is solved by using a target capital 
structure.
131
 
A combination of the following factors has to be taken into account when setting the target 
capital structure: 
 The company’s current market based capital structure – The elements of the current 
capital structure should be identified with their market prices. This shouldn’t 
represent a difficulty if the company’s securities are publicly traded, however in 
many cases the company’s sources of funds are not traded on the public market, 
hence estimation of these values is needed. For instance in the case of debt-type 
financing the market value can be approximated by identifying each financing 
instrument, defining the underlying credit quality of the valued instrument by 
looking at credit ratings and assessing the yield to maturity for which it would trade 
on the marketplace by applying the yield of securities with similar coupons, 
maturities and ratings. Finally the yield to maturity on a similar issue is employed 
as a discount rate to compute the present value of the financing payments. 
132
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 The capital structure of comparable companies – The benefit of this approach is 
that one can assess if the capital structure of the company is similar to that of the 
industry average or if it deviates as a result of particular financial policy decisions. 
 Management’s position related to capital structure – Management’s philosophy 
regarding historical financing decisions might help in having a better understanding 
of how the company’s capital structure is being managed. 133 
 
        5.1.7. Cost of equity estimation 
 
In order to derive the rate of return of the company’s stock we use the CAPM134 model, 
developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), which “defines a stock’s risk as its 
sensitivity to the stock market”: 
                             where, 
                 =  The risk free rate 
              =   The expected rate of return on the market portfolio 
         = The market risk premium 
               = The levered systematic risk of the stock
135
 
The following section describes how to estimate each variable of the above equation. 
 
        5.1.8. Estimating the risk-free rate 
 
The risk-free rate is the “building block” used for the estimation of the cost of equity and 
consequently the cost of capital.
136
 Copeland et al define the risk-free rate as “the return on 
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a security or portfolio of securities that has no default risk and is completely uncorrelated 
with returns on anything else in the economy.”137 
Damodaran names two conditions that have to be met when choosing the risk-free rate: 
 The lack of default risk. This implies the use of government securities since 
securities issued by private companies are disqualified as they all bear a certain 
default risk 
 “For an investment to have an actual return equal to its expected return there can 
be no reinvestment risk.” Meaning that “the specific instrument used to derive the 
risk-free rate will vary depending upon the period over which you want the return 
to be guaranteed.”138 
Consistency in currency and the duration of the cash flows is important when choosing the 
risk free rate. Thus as in Cadbury’s case the cash flows are estimated in British pounds, the 
long term government bond chosen will be in British pound rates. Furthermore Damodaran 
suggests the use of a 10-year government bond, matching it with the duration of the cash 
flows estimated in the analysis.
139
  
 
        5.1.9. Calculating the equity beta 
 
The equity beta is a driver for the stock’s expected return and “measures how much the 
stock and market move together.” As beta is not a directly observable variable several 
assumptions and estimations have to be made in order to compute its value.
140
  
Damodaran names three factors that determine the beta of a company: 
 The type of the business: “Since betas measure the risk of a firm relative to a 
market index, the more sensitive a business is to market conditions, the higher is its 
beta.” Thus, ceteris paribus non-cyclical businesses like food companies will have 
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lower betas than for example companies involved in housing, showing a high 
sensitivity to market conditions. 
 The amount of operating leverage in the company: “The degree of operating 
leverage is a function of cost function of a firm, and is usually defined in terms of 
the relationship between fixed costs and total costs.” Hence a company with high 
operating leverage will have higher fluctuations in EBIT leading in turn to a higher 
beta. 
 The financial leverage of the company: Holding other things equal, an increase in 
the company’s financial leverage consequently increases its equity beta.141 
The estimation of the beta of an asset implies the regression of the returns of an asset “on 
an index representing the market portfolio, over a reasonable period of time.” Hence beta 
estimates are influenced by the choice of the market index used to regress against the 
stock, by the time period used for the estimation and by the return interval used to measure 
historical returns on the stock. The result of the different choices regarding the market 
index, time period and return interval are different beta estimates for the same company. 
Further criticism is brought to the historical nature of the beta estimation since “our 
objective is not to estimate the best beta we can over the last period but to obtain the best 
beta we can for the future.”142 
As a result many investment data services have tried to improve the beta estimates from 
the regressions by adjusting the regression betas towards one. The rationale behind this 
approach lies in the result of several studies showing that company betas tend to move 
towards one.
143
 
To improve the precision of beta estimates and the accuracy of the company valuation we 
look at the betas of peer companies. As the approach can be biased by looking at 
companies with more debt, facing a higher financial risk, we derive the unlevered betas of 
peer companies and re-lever the beta to the company’s target capital structure. We use the 
following equation to derive the equity beta or levered beta of a company:
144
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        5.1.10 Estimating the market risk premium 
 
Market risk premiums, the difference between the market’s expected return and the risk 
free rate, are key inputs for the calculation of the cost of equity and at the same their 
estimation is the most disputed issue in corporate finance. It is general consensus though, 
“that riskier investments should have higher expected returns than safer investments, to be 
considered good investments.”145 
Damodaran names several factors that determine equity risk premiums: 
 Risk aversion: As investors become more risk averse, equity risk premiums will 
increase. Several factors influence risk aversion such as the age of the investors or 
the preference of current over future consumption. Evidence has shown that 
investors get more risk averse as they are ageing, leading to higher risk premiums. 
Furthermore equity risk premiums should increase when investors prefer current 
consumption and savings rates decrease in the market.
146
 
 Economic risk: Equity risk premiums are influenced by macroeconomic factors 
such as inflation, economic growth and interest rates and the uncertainty about their 
level.
147
 
 Information: When information about cash flows and earnings of companies in the 
market is not available or is not reliable, investors will demand to be compensated 
for additional uncertainty and will ask higher equity risk premiums. 
 Liquidity: Illiquidity creates additional risk in the market. Thus, if investors are 
forced to “accept large discounts on estimated value or pay high transaction costs 
to liquidate equity positions”, they will ask for higher equity risk premiums.148 
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Damodaran defines three different estimation approaches which are generally used to 
estimate equity risk premiums. One is the survey approach where investors and managers 
provide estimates for future equity risk premiums. The second is the historical return 
approach, where we look at “returns earned in the past on equities relative to riskless 
investments and use the historical premium as the expectation.” And third, the implied 
approach, which represents an “attempt to estimate a forward-looking premium based on 
the market rates or prices on traded assets today.”149 
The premiums estimated can vary considerably across the three methods and we face the 
dilemma, which number to use in our analysis. Damodaran argues, that “the choice of the 
premium will depend upon the forecast period, whether you believe markets are efficient 
and whether you are required to be market neutral in your analysis”, concluding that there 
is not a single approach to estimate equity risk premiums that applies for all analyses.
150
 
 
        5.1.11. Cost of debt estimation 
 
When the debt of the company “is highly rated and not callable or convertible”, the 
promised yield to maturity of the company’s debt is a good estimate for the pre-tax cost of 
debt. Hence when a company’s debt is relatively risk-free we can derive the cost of debt as 
yield to maturity times one minus the company’s corporate tax rate. However this doesn’t 
hold for highly levered companies with increased default risk as the promised yield to 
maturity on risky debt will be higher.
151
 Thus, when estimating the cost of debt “for a 
company with investment-grade debt (debt rated BBB or better), yield to maturity is a 
suitable proxy.” It is essential though to use long-term bonds in order to match the duration 
of company’s free cash flow to the duration of the bond.152 
If bond ratings are used to derive the cost of debt of a company, Damodaran suggests three 
steps, which need to be followed: First estimate the company’s “dollar debt and interest 
expense at each debt ratio”, both dollar debt and interest expenses rise as leverage 
increases. Second, “we compute a financial ratio (…) that measures default risk and use 
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the ratio to estimate a rating for the firm; again, as firms borrow more, this rating will 
decline.” Third, we arrive to the pre-tax cost of debt, by adding a default spread, derived 
from the estimated rating, to the risk-free rate.
153
 
 
        5.1.12. Calculating equity value from firm value 
 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the ultimate goal of a company valuation is to 
value the company’s equity. In order to get from the value of operating assets to the value 
of equity we need to net out any non-equity claims against the company value. 
Furthermore non-operating assets owned by the company, which are not included in the 
free cash flow calculation but represent value to the company’s shareholders need to be 
added on to the value of the company. 
The table below provides the calculation steps required to derive equity value from 
operating asset value: 
 
Table 3: Deriving equity value from operating asset value
154     
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Step Result
Discount the FCF of the firm at the cost Value of operating assets of the firm
of capital to arrive to
Add the value of any assets whose earnings  + Cash and cash equivalents
are not part of operating income  + Value of minority holdings in other
     companies
 + Value of idle/unutilized assets
Substract non-equity claims on the company  - Value of interest bearing debt
 - Present value of operting lease 
    commitments
 - Estimated value of minority interests
    in consolidated companies
 - Unfunded health care or pension
    obligations
 - Expected litigation payout
In order to arrive to the value of equity  = Value of Equity
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5.2. The relative valuation  
 
While the discounted cash flow analysis is viewed as being the most accurate method to 
value a company’s assets, relative valuation methods provide an easy and less time 
consuming approach for asset valuation, by looking how “similar assets are currently 
priced by the market.”155 
The first step when conducting a relative valuation is the identification of comparable 
companies. When selecting the comparable companies, one should be aware that 
companies within the same industry can still differ in terms of risk, growth potential and 
cash flows.
156
 The next step is to convert the prices of similar companies into multiples and 
compare the resulting multiples across the comparable companies. Damodaran defines this 
process as “standardizing prices“, which can be conducted by applying earnings, revenue, 
book value or sector specific variables.
157
 
An accurate multiples analysis can provide valuable insights about a company; 
nevertheless the pitfalls in the application of this method can lead to confusion. Damodaran 
names four steps that need to be followed in order to arrive to sound multiples: 
1. “Define the multiple consistently and measure it uniformly across the firms being 
compared.” 
2. “Have a sense of how the multiple varies across firms in the market. In other 
words, we need to know what a high value, a low value and a typical value are for 
the multiple in question.” 
3. “Identify the fundamental variables that determine each multiple and how changes 
in these fundamentals affect the value of the multiple.” 
4. “Find truly comparable firms and adjust for differences between the firms on 
fundamental characteristics."
158
 
Finally the comparable multiple is applied to the company’s financial figure to arrive to the 
value of the company.  
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6. Valuation of Cadbury Plc. 
 
Based on the theoretical framework outlined in the previous chapter, I derive Cadbury’s 
standalone equity value per share using a discounted cash flow analysis. The result of the 
discounted cash flow valuation are validated by applying enterprise multiples for 
comparable companies. Furthermore I perform a precedent transaction analysis using 
EBITDA multiples over a class of major deals in the food processing industry prior to 
Cadbury’s takeover. The last subsection discusses Kraft Foods’ takeover offer in the light 
of the results yielded by the three valuation methods. 
 
    6.1. Discounted Cash Flow Valuation  
 
The discounted cash flow valuation is conducted by applying a three-stage model. After 
deriving the free cash flow to the firm in the reference year, I determine the forecast 
horizon and assumptions necessary to compute the future free cash flows and the terminal 
value. The valuation is performed by discounting the Free Cash Flows to the Firm by the 
calculated weighted average cost of capital. As a last step I calculate Cadbury’s equity 
value to finally arrive at the equity value per share. 
 
        6.1.1. Deriving the Free Cash Flows to the Firm 
 
The first step in valuing Cadbury’s operations was deriving the free cash flow to the firm 
for the reference year 2009 using the consolidated financial statement of the company. 
In order to correct the misclassification of R&D expenses, which represents a capital 
expense and is included in Cadbury’s income statement in the operating expenses, a 
capitalization of these expenses and consequently adjustment of EBIT is necessary. 
Corrections regarding operating leases are not applicable and will not be conducted as the 
company reports no operating leases in its income statement. 
56 
 
Assuming an amortizable life of three years and a linear amortization over the period, I 
collected data on R&D expenses over the last three years, to finally arrive at the value of 
the research asset and the amortization of the R&D expenses in the reference year. The 
next step was to adjust the EBIT to reflect the capitalization of the R&D expense. This is 
conducted by adding back the R&D expense in the reference year to the EBIT and netting 
out the calculated amortization of the research asset. 
The following table illustrates the computation of the value of the research asset and 
amortization in the reference year: 
 
Table 4: Capitalization of Cadbury’s R&D expenses 
 
After carrying out the necessary adjustments to EBIT, I applied the effective tax rate for 
the reference year in order to arrive to the after-tax operating income of the company. As a 
next step I added back depreciation and amortization and subtracted the change in working 
capital obtained from Cadbury’s consolidated financial statement. After deducting the 
capital expenditures I arrive to the free cash flow of the company in the reference year. 
The calculation steps used to derive the free cash flow in the reference year 2009 are 
summarized in the table below: 
Year R&D expense Amortization reference year
2009 80 1 80.00 -
2008 69 67% 46.00 23.00
2007 68 33% 22.67 22.67
2006 77 0% 0 25.67
148.67
71.33
Value of research asset
Unamoritized portion
Amortization expense reference year
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Table 5: Cadbury’s Free Cash Flow calculation for reference year 
 
Furthermore using the equations presented under subsection 5.1.2. Forecasting the free 
cash flows of the firm, I derived the return on invested capital as well as the reinvestment 
rate and computed the growth in revenues and operating income for the reference year 
2009 so that the forecasted figures are anchored in fact in the light of the company’s 
historical performance. 
 
Table 6: Key financial ratios for reference year 
 
 
 
 
 
Free Cash Flow Calculation Reference year
(in GBPm) 2008
Adjusted EBIT 816.67
Effective tax rate (%) 27.30%
After-tax EBIT 593.72
 + Depreciation and amortization 222
 - Change in working capital -105
 - Capital expenditures 408
Free Cash Flow to the Firm 512.72
Key ratios 2009
Return on capital invested 8.79%
Reinvestment rate 13.64%
Revenue growth 10.98%
EBIT growth 26.65%
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        6.1.2. Growth period definition and free cash flow forecast 
 
Building on the considerations stated in subsection 5.1.2. Forecasting the free cash flows 
of the firm, the length of the forecast period was chosen with ten years, using three growth 
stages, divided into a four-year stage of accelerated growth, a six-year stage of stable 
moderate growth followed by a growth perpetuity starting after the tenth year. The 
assumptions and characteristics of each growth stage are discussed below: 
1. A high growth period of four years, starting 2010 and ending in 2013, in line with 
the company’s extension of its Vision into Action business plan until 2013. During 
this period the company will earn returns on invested capital in excess of its cost of 
capital, bringing it to reach the average return on invested capital in the food 
processing industry by the end of this four year stage. The reinvestment rate is 
increased in order to reflect enhanced investments into the company’s operating 
assets. The growth in operating profit increases as the company’s return on invested 
capital improves. 
2. A moderate growth period of six years starting in 2014 characterized by a stable 
growth period. The return on invested capital is maintained at the industry average 
and the reinvestment rate is kept constant. 
3. A growth perpetuity after the ten year forecast period. Since a company is not 
expected to sustain a higher growth rate than the one in the economy in perpetuity, 
the growth rate in the terminal year is set equal to the expected global real gross 
domestic product.
159
 Furthermore excess returns are not expected to be maintained 
in perpetuity, thus the return on capital will drop below the cost of capital and the 
reinvestment rate is decreased accordingly. 
The expected growth in revenues during the forecast period was defined by looking at the 
historical growth pattern of the company, management forecasts as part of Cadbury’s 
Vision into Action business plan and the revenue growth of comparable companies in the 
food processing industry. 
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Starting with the first forecast year, I moved to the marginal tax rate levied on taxable 
income in the UK and maintained a constant level of the tax rate during the forecast period. 
The company’s working capital was set as a constant ratio of the expected revenues. 
Applying the sales-to-working capital ratio for the food processing industry, sourced from 
professor Damodaran’s website, I calculated the year-on-year change in working capital. 
The net capital expenditures, defined as the difference between gross capital expenditures 
and depreciation was defined using the equation under subsection 5.1.2. Forecasting the 
free cash flows of the firm, in order to provide consistency between the reinvestment rate 
and the amount of investment during the forecast period.  
 
        6.1.3. Weighted average cost of capital 
 
The next step in Cadbury’s valuation was deriving the weighted average cost of capital. 
As Cadbury is a public company, information about market values for equity and debt are 
available and no further assumptions are necessary to derive these values.  
When setting the target capital structure I looked at the company’s actual capital structure 
and the management’s position related to financial policy decisions. The following changes 
to the company’s capital structure are stated in the 2008 annual report: 
“During 2008, our market capitalisation decreased to approximately £8.2 billion from 
£13.1 billion. This was principally driven by the demerger of the Americas Beverages 
business, which resulted in a reduction of £3.5 billion and the widespread fall in equity 
values during 2008. Net debt decreased during the year from £3,219 million at the end of 
2007 to £1,887 million at the end of 2008.”160 
 
Furthermore on 3 April 2009 the company completed the disposal of Australia Beverages, 
becoming a pure-play confectionery business. This resulted in an observed market-debt-to-
enterprise-value of 16.52% end of 2009, representing a decrease from the previous year’s 
ratio of 25.73%. I further looked at the estimated average debt-to-equity ratio for the food 
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processing industry, provided by Damodaran. The food processing industry shows a rather 
moderate leverage ratio amounting to 29.35%. As food processing is a broad industry, I 
looked at the leverage ratios of comparable confectionery companies (Hershey, Nestlé and 
Kraft Foods). The leverage ratios ranged from 13.22% (Nestlé) to 50.15% (Kraft Foods), 
where Hershey, the company with the most similar product portfolio to that of Cadbury, 
showed a leverage ratio of 24.25%. With the observed debt-to-equity ratio of 19.78%, the 
rather low leverage ratios in the confectionery industry segment and management’s 
historical decisions regarding financing of the company, I considered the actual capital 
structure as a good proxy for Cadbury’s target capital structure. 
In estimating the equity beta I looked at Cadbury’s levered adjusted beta, which I 
unlevered in order to cross-checked it with the betas of comparable confectionery 
companies. The adjusted betas sourced from Bloomberg were the two year weekly betas 
regressed against the S&P 500 market index. The confectionery segment is a non-cyclical 
business characterized by a low sensitivity to market conditions and with rather low 
leverage ratios, which is also confirmed by the betas of the observed companies. The 
average formed over the comparable companies’ unlevered beta revealed a slightly lower 
value than Cadbury’s unlevered beta. The equity beta for the calculation of the cost of 
equity was chosen as Cadbury’s levered adjusted beta. 
 
 Figure 8: Deriving Cadbury’s equity beta 
The risk-free benchmark rate was the 10-year U.K. government bond
161
, furthermore the 
Q4 2009 equity risk premium was sourced from professor Damodaran’s webpage. As a 
next step I plugged in the determined variables into the CAPM equation to arrive to 
Cadbury’s cost of equity. 
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Unlevered beta comparables 0.59
Unlevered beta Cadbury 0.69
Levered adjusted beta Cadbury 0.79
Equity beta Cadbury 0.79
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Figure 9: Calculation of Cadbury’s cost of equity 
 
Given Cadbury’s stable profitability and bond rating of BBB, the cost of debt was chosen 
as the average of the company’s yield to maturity on its long term notes.  
The cost of capital was computed using the target capital structure, the derived cost of 
capital and after-tax cost of debt and assumed to remain constant over the forecasted 
period. 
 
Figure 10: Calculation of Cadbury’s WACC 
 
Risk free rate 4.10%
Equity risk premium 5.30%
Levered adjusted beta 0.79
D/E ratio 19.78%
Marginal tax rate 28.00%
Cost of equity 8.27%
Cost of equity 8.27%
Target Equity/EV 83.48%
Cost of debt 5.92%
After-tax cost of debt 4.26%
Target Debt/EV 16.52%
WACC 7.61%
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Table 7: Free Cash Flow projection and present value calculation    
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TV
Revenue growth 10.98% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 4.00%
Return on capital 8.79% 9.34% 9.89% 10.45% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 7.50%
Reinvestment rate 13.64% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 60.00% 40.00%
Growth in EBIT 26.65% 11.89% 11.85% 11.85% 11.89% 6.60% 6.60% 6.60% 6.60% 6.60% 6.60% 3.00%
(in GBP million)
Revenues 5,975.00 6,692.00 7,495.04 8,394.44 9,401.78 9,965.88 10,563.84 11,197.67 11,869.53 12,581.70 13,336.60 13,870.07
Working capital 367.46 411.56 460.94 516.26 578.21 612.90 649.68 688.66 729.98 773.77 820.20 853.01
EBIT 816.67 913.79 1,022.11 1,143.27 1,279.20 1,363.63 1,453.63 1,549.57 1,651.84 1,760.86 1,877.08 1,933.39
Tax rate (in %) 27.30% 28.00% 28.00% 28.00% 28.00% 28.00% 28.00% 28.00% 28.00% 28.00% 28.00% 28.00%
After-tax EBIT 593.72 657.93 735.92 823.15 921.03 981.81 1,046.61 1,115.69 1,189.32 1,267.82 1,351.50 1,392.04
Δ in Working capital -105.00 44.10 49.39 55.31 61.95 34.69 36.77 38.98 41.32 43.80 46.43 32.81
Capex-Depr.&Amort. 186.00 350.66 392.16 438.58 490.66 554.40 591.19 630.43 672.28 716.89 764.47 524.01
FCF 512.72 263.17 294.37 329.26 368.41 392.73 418.65 446.28 475.73 507.13 540.60 835.22
WACC 7.61% 7.61% 7.61% 7.61% 7.61% 7.61% 7.61% 7.61% 7.61% 7.61% 7.61%
TV 18,123.70
PV(FCF) 283.20 340.86 410.28 493.99 566.66 650.02 745.64 855.33 981.15 1125.48
PV(TV) 8,705.28
Reference 
year
Stable growth 
in perpetuity
High growth period Moderate growth period
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        6.1.4. Deriving the equity value 
 
After computing the enterprise value, which was calculated by adding up the discounted 
free cash flows over the forecast period to the present value of the terminal value, I carried 
on with the calculation of the equity value to ultimately arrive to Cadbury’s share price. 
I first calculated the net financial debt by taking into account the company’s total 
borrowings including short-term and long-term borrowings and offsetting the cash and 
cash equivalents as well as short-term investments. Using the calculation steps presented in 
subsection 5.1.12. Calculating equity value from firm value, I computed Cadbury’s equity 
value. Starting from the enterprise value I subtracted the net financial debt, the minority 
interests and the unfunded pension obligations obtained from the company’s consolidated 
financial statement.  
As a last step I divided the value of equity by the total number of shares outstanding
162
 in 
order to derive the company’s share price. 
The calculation steps used are presented in the following table: 
 
Table 8: Deriving Cadbury’s equity value per share 
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 Bloomberg 
PV of Free Cash Flows (GBPm) 6,452.60
 + PV of Terminal Value (GBPm) 8,705.28
 = Enterprise Value (GBPm) 15,157.88
 - Net financial debt (GBPm) 1,441.00
 - Minority interests (GBPm) 504.00
 - Unfunded pension obligations (GBPm) 20.00
 = Equity Value (GPBm) 13,192.88
 / Nr. of shares outstanding (m) 1,356.00
 = Equity Value per Share (GBP) 9.73
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    6.2. Relative valuation 
 
In order to cross-check the plausibility of the results derived using the discounted cash 
flow valuation I performed a multiples analysis, looking at comparable companies in the 
food processing industry. 
I avoided applying the industry average multiples as this approach overlooks the fact that 
companies, even though in the same industry, can still differ significantly in terms of 
expected growth rates, risk, capital structure and returns on invested capital. As the class of 
comparable companies would have been too narrow to perform an accurate multiple based 
analysis given the small number of listed pure-play confectionery companies for which 
data could be obtained, I included companies engaged in the packaged food processing 
sector.  
Controlling for differences across the food processing sector, I selected comparable 
companies by accounting for several criterias. One of the criterias was choosing companies 
with similar product portfolios, sensitivity to increases in agricultural commodity prices, 
business models and similar financial leverage, translating into similar risk profiles. Next 
to the increased presence in developed countries the selected companies need to have a 
high exposure and thus cash flow generation in emerging markets. Furthermore the 
companies considered need to have similar expected earnings growth rates. 
In order to find the boundaries of Cadbury’s fair value, the relative valuation was 
performed using EBITDA, EBIT and sales multiples. Enterprise value multiples were 
chosen as these are not affected by changes in the capital structure, which allows a 
comparison across companies irrespective of their capital structure. 
The 2009 company information for European and US companies in the food processing 
industry were obtained from professor Damodaran’s website.  The following table presents 
the seven comparable companies, the criterias accounted for in the selection and the 
median multiples across the comparables class. 
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Table 9: Selected class of comparable companies for relative valuation
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As a next stept I applied the median multiples across the comparables class to Cadbury’s 
2009 financials, arriving at an EV ranging from GBPm 11,091.82 to 12,654.40.  
I followed the same calculation steps to compute the equity value and equity value per 
share as the ones used in the discounted cash flow anaylsis. After subtrating the net 
financial debt, the minority interest and the unfunded pension obligations I derive the 
equity values. Dividing the figure by the total number of shares outstanding I obtain a 
share price ranging from GBP 6.73 to 7.88. 
 
Table 10: Relative valuation based on EV/EBITDA multiples 
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 Prof. Damodaran’s website 
Company
Market cap 
(in USDm)
Firm value
 (in USDm)
Market 
Debt/Capital
Expected growth in 
EPS next 5 years
Beta EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT EV/Sales
 Hershey 8,279.40 10,286.90 19.52% 4.50% 0.65 10.05x 13.30x 2.00x
 Nestlé 174,288.00 197,323.90 11.67% 8.65% 0.50 11.06x 13.26x 1.86x
 Lindt 5,535.00 5,558.70 0.43% 5.50% 0.50 12.18x 16.02x 1.90x
 Kraft Foods 40,378.90 60,629.90 33.40% 6.50% 0.61 9.42x 11.17x 1.39x
 Danone 37,609.50 50,004.50 24.79% 4.12% 0.63 12.85x 16.84x 2.31x
 Parmalat 4,781.10 5,500.80 13.08% 2.00% 0.63 13.81x 17.92x 0.69x
 Unilever 91,979.20 106,970.80 14.01% 5.31% 0.59 12.26x 14.41x 1.82x
Median 14.01% 5.31% 0.61 12.18x 14.41x 1.86x
Relative valuation based on EBITDA EBIT Sales
 Multiple comparables 12.18 14.41 1.86
 x Cadbury financials (GBPm) 1,038.67 816.67 5,975.00
 = Enterprise Value (GBPm) 12,654.40 11,771.15 11,091.82
  - Net debt (GBPm) 1,441.00 1,441.00 1,441.00
 - Unfunded pension plans (GBPm) 504.00 504.00 504.00
 - Minority interest (GBPm) 20.00 20.00 20.00
 = Equity Value (GBPm) 10,689.40 9,806.15 9,126.82
 / Nr. shares outstanding (m) 1,356.00 1,356.00 1,356.00
 = Equity Value per Share (GBP) 7.88 7.23 6.73
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    6.3. Precedent transaction analysis 
 
While almost every acquisition is backed up by a discounted cash flow anaylsis it is 
common practice to determine the value paid for a target company using multiples. A 
common method used by practitioners in mergers and acquisitions is the precedent 
transactions analysis. The method uses multiples in recent mergers and acquisition deals 
usually within the same business sector as a proxy to determine the value of a company. 
 
Looking at previous transactions and the multiples that bidders paid in order to acquire a 
target company represents an easy approach as it is based on public information, it can 
reveal valuable information about bidding, consolidation trends, investor appetite and can 
be used as a benchmark when assessing the multiple paid for a target company.  At the 
same time, as with the comparable companies analysis, it is often difficult to find a set of 
truly comparable transactions. The multiples paid can vary significantly across the 
transactions and can be misleading especially when acquisitions in the past have been 
influenced by market conditions. 
Thus, it is essential to select a relatively recent transaction universe as this will provide a 
better reflection of the price that acquirers in the market are currently willing to pay. As 
with comparable companies analysis it is almost impossible to find a perfect precedent 
transaction, since no company is totally similar to another, but one can control for 
differences across the transaction universe by accounting for characteristics like business 
sector, geography, and distribution channels.  
An important distinction between the comparable companies and the precedent 
transactions analysis is that the precedent transactions method captures the control 
premium in the valuation, meaning the premium that the acquirer had to pay in order to 
gain control over the target company.  
I thus selected ten precedent transactions in the food processing industry, dating back to 
2000 and calculated the average EV/EBITDA multiple. 
67 
 
 
Table 11: Major global M&A valuation multiples 2000-2008
164
 
 
Looking at the previous M&A bid multiples one can see that Kraft got a good bargain by 
paying just GBP 8.50 per Cadbury share. The average transaction multiple has been 16.1x 
EBITDA and 2.8x sales, figures which are elevated by the most recent deals prior to 
Cadbury’s takeover, the 21.7x EBITDA paid by Danone for Numico and the 19.3x 
EBITDA paid by Mars for Wrigley. Even if we exclude the two figures we arrive at an 
average multiple of 14.8x EBITDA, which is still reasonably higher than the 13x EBITDA 
paid by Kraft for Cadbury. 
The following table provides the implied equity value per share for Cadbury using the 
average EV/EBITDA multiples over the class of comparable transactions in light of Kraft’s 
final offer. 
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 Mergermarket, Thomson Financial 
Acquirer Target Year Price (USD bn) EV/EBITDA Price/Sales
Unilever Bestfoods 2000 24.2 14.3x 2.9x
Kraft Nabisco 2000 18.9 14.0x 2.3x
Pepsico Quaker Oats 2001 14 15.9x 2.7x
General Mills Pillsbury 2001 10.5 n.a. 2.5x
Nestlé Ralston Purina 2001 11.2 15.7x 3.9x
Cadbury Schweppes Adams 2003 4.2 14.3x 0.0x
Nestlé Gerber 2007 5.5 15.7x 2.8x
Kraft Danone Biscuits 2007 7.3 13.6x 2.7x
Danone Numico 2007 18.4 21.7x 4.3x
Mars Wrigley 2008 23.4 19.3x 4.3x
Mean 16.1x 2.8x
Mean (excl. Numico & Wrigley) 14.8x 2.5x
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Table 12: Kraft’s offer vs. precedent transaction multiples 
 
If we would take the 14.8x EBITDA multiple, Kraft would have had to pay GBP 9.89 per 
each Cadbury share and taking the overall multiple of 16.1x EBITDA we arrive at a share 
price of GBP 10.88. Perhaps in a competitive bidding process these prices would have 
been realistic but overall the 13x EBITDA multiple paid by Kraft for Cadbury makes it the 
cheapest major deal in the global food processing industry in more than a decade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Mean all 
transactions
Mean excl. 
Nabisco & 
Wrigley
Kraft offer
 EV/EBITDA 16.1 14.8 13.0
 x Cadbury EBITDA 2009 1,038.67 1,038.67 1,038.67
 = EV (GBPm) 16,722.53 15,372.27 13,502.67
 - Net debt (GBPm) 1,441.00 1,441.00 1,441.00
 - Unfunded pension plans (GBPm) 504.00 504.00 504.00
 - Minority interest (GBPm) 20.00 20.00 20.00
 = Equity Value (GBPm) 14,757.53 13,407.27 11,537.67
 / Nr. shares outstanding (m) 1,356.00 1,356.00 1,356.00
 = Equity Value per Share (GBP) 10.88 9.89 8.50
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6.4. Offer analysis in light of the valuation performed 
 
The goal of the valuation performed was to derive Cadbury’s standalone value per share in 
absence of Kraft’s takeover bid and any speculation regarding a possible takeover offer. 
The discounted cash flow analysis performed yielded a share price of GBP 9.73 for 
Cadbury while the multiple-based approach resulted in a lower value per share of GBP 
6.73 to 7.88.  The performed valuation and consequently the derived equity values per 
share have to be interpreted with prudence and in light of the assumptions on which they 
are based while bearing in mind the following: 
 Discounted cash flow valuation is highly sensitive to small changes in assumptions 
regarding the expected return on invested capital and as a consequence the expected 
growth rates, the weighted average cost of capital and the future macroeconomic 
environment. Hence “any analysis is only as accurate as the forecasts it relies 
on.”165  
 On the other hand the accuracy of the relative valuation depends on the universe of 
comparable companies selected. Finding pure-play comparable companies is 
obviously not possible but identifying and accounting for differences in growth, 
risk and cash flow potential across the companies can help reduce the 
inconsistencies of the estimated values. Furthermore as relative valuation is much 
more likely to “reflect the current market mood”166 it can result in too high values 
if the comparable companies are overvalued by the market or too low values if 
these companies are undervalued. 
Looking at Cadbury’s share price of GBP 5.68 on the last trading day in September 2009 
prior to Kraft’s initial offer, the discounted cash flow analysis and relative valuation 
conducted revealed significantly higher equity values per share. Considering that the 
derived values do not incorporate any premium that Kraft would have paid to gain control 
over Cadbury, reflecting the cost and revenue synergies expected from the takeover, one 
would conclude that Kraft was able to acquire an outstanding company at a bargain. 
                                                 
 
165
 Koller, Goedhart, Wessels (2005), p. 361 
166
 Damodaran (2006), p.303 
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On the other hand the discounted cash flow analysis performed by Bernstein Research, 
who probably gave the deal the largest coverage, derives an even higher stand-alone equity 
value per share of GBP 10.43 based on the released guidance for 2009 year end profits, 
concluding that Kraft acquired a great company, with “tremendous operating momentum 
at a steal” by paying only GPB 8.50 per Cadbury share.167 
In the light of the valuation conducted, Kraft’s initial offer of GBP 7.45 per share, which 
dropped to GBP 7.17 by the time it has formlized its bid in November 2009 due to 
currency movements and a decrease in Kraft’s share price, seems actually bold. The 
“attractive multiple” of 13.9x EBITDA appraised in Kraft’s initial offer letter looks 
disappointing especially as the valuation relies on 2008 financials. Basing your offer on 
2008 year-end figures when the target company has meanwhile released strong updated 
financials and year-end guidance just isn’t convincing and confirms the importance of 
updated earnings. This point was also highlighted in Cadbury’s defence document, which 
placed Kraft’s offer at an even less appealing multiple of 11.6x 2009 EBITDA. 
Kraft’s final offer of GBP 8.50 per share represents a 49.64% premium above Cadbury’s 
share price of GBP 5.68 prior to Kraft’s proposal announcement. When determining the 
offer premium Eckbo (2009) suggests in an empirical research analyzing offer premiums in 
corporate takeovers, the selection of a target share price two to three months prior to the 
initial offer announcement. The rationale behind this approach is that “a price this far back 
from the initial bid is largely free of market anticipation of the pending offer.”168 Looking 
at Cadbury’s share price of GBP 5.29 on July 1, 2009 prior to any speculation launched by 
analysts regarding a possible consolidation in the confectionery industry the final premium 
paid by Kraft is 60.68%. The premium paid is in line with Eckbo’s research, who finds on 
a sample of 10,806 control contests for publicly traded targets in the US between 1973 and 
2002, that hostile takeovers attain the highest final offer premiums (61%).
169
  
Considering the stock price prior to the offer announcement and Kraft’s final offer one 
would say that Cadbury’s management has done a good job in serving its shareholders’ 
interests. Nevertheless the valuation conducted based on 2009 full-year profits, released 
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after Kraft has gained control over Cadbury, revealed a significantly higher equity value 
per share, which doesn’t make Kraft’s offer look so generous. Moreover criticism can be 
brought to Cadbury’s management for allowing Kraft to launch its bid from such a low 
share price. With a history of failing to deliver ambitious profit targets, product recalls due 
to a labelling error in 2007 and a salmonella contamination in 2006 which affected seven 
of its products, Cadbury has disapponted the market, which reacted rather sceptical to 
management’s efforts to deliver stronger operating performance through the 
implementation of the Vision into Action business plan. The consequence was a low stock 
price, which made the company even more attractive to possible suitors. 
Although Kraft was forced to increase its bid, the precedent transaction analysis showed 
that the 13x 2009 EBITDA multiple offered by Kraft represented the lowest multiple paid 
in a major mergers and acquisitions deal in the food processing industry in a decade prior 
to Cadbury’s takeover.  
The undervalued stock price, the strong growth prospects combined with the strong 
operating momentum highlighted in the 2009 year-end guidance and confirmed by the 
released 2009 annual report, prove that Kraft was able to acquire an outstanding asset at a 
very cheap price. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of the current thesis was to analyze the hostile takeover of the iconic British 
brand, Cadbury, by multinational Kraft Foods while answering the following questions:   
 What was the motivation behind Cadbury’s takeover? 
 What takeover defence mechanisms did the board of Cadbury employ and how 
effective were these in maximizing shareholders’ wealth? 
 Did the price offered by Kraft Foods represent the fair value of Cadbury? 
The austerity measures of several companies during the financial crisis combined with low 
stock prices and decreasing company valuations exposed weakened companies to the raids 
of highly liquid corporations with a strong capital basis and efficient operations.  The spike 
in commodity costs and the increased competition from retailer brands called for 
diversification and consolidation in the confectionery industry, with large players turning 
their attention towards complementary sectors, niche markets and expansion in emerging 
markets with huge growth potential. Furthermore the acquisition of Wrigley by Mars in the 
spring of 2008 turned out to be an important event. The scale achieved though the 
combination of Mars and Wrigley made every other confectionery company in the market 
rethink its strategy and vulnerabilities.  
The attractiveness of Cadbury’s business, the strong operating performance delivered 
through the implementation of the Vision into Action business plan and its strong potential 
of operating margin improvements combined with the high exposure to emerging markets 
accounting for over 40% of the company’s sales and its low share price, made Cadbury the 
perfect target for potential suitors. The disposal of Cadbury’s Americas and Australia 
beverages business in 2008 and 2009 respectively, transforming Cadbury into a pure-play 
confectionery company made it a likely takeover candidate for Kraft Foods, who was 
looking to improve its brand portfolio, strengthen its vulnerable position in the European 
chocolate segment and increase its exposure in emerging markets. 
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A combination of the two companies would create a “global powerhouse in snacks, 
confectionery and quick meals” placing the combined entity as the world leading 
confectionery company with a market share of 14.8%, before its main competitor 
Mars/Wrigley. Furthermore the complementary nature of Cadbury would allow Kraft an 
entry into faster growing markets like India and South Africa and consolidate its position 
in South America. The combined companies would benefit from each other’s distribution 
channels and would provide the necessary scale for an even more effective competition in 
the confectionery segment. Expected operational, administrative, marketing and selling 
cost savings of USD 625 annually and revenue synergies will drive long-term growth rates 
resulting in estimated total revenues of USD 50 billion per year.    
The prohibition of several preventive anti-takeover measures under the UK City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers limited Cadbury’s options for defending itself when confronted 
with an unwanted suitor. As seen in chapter three the most commonly employed defence 
mechanism for UK traded companies is the release of profit forecasts and the finding of a 
white knight, strategies also employed by Cadbury’s management. The release of its 2009 
year-end guidance and the speculation around a possible bid by Hershey and Ferrero 
served Cadbury well, increasing its share price and putting pressure on Kraft to raise its 
offer although no actual threat of a rival offer was in place.  
While putting a credible defence and maximizing shareholders’ wealth, as holders of stock 
received a substantial premium to their shares worth GBP 5.68 just before Kraft’s public 
offer, the only accusation that can be brought to Cadbury’s management is that it allowed 
Kraft to start its bid from such a low share price.  
The standalone company valuation performed in chapter six based on the 2009 year-end 
consolidated financial statement proved that Cadbury’s stock was undervalued. The 
discounted cash flow analysis revealed a share price of GBP 9.73 and the relative valuation 
based on comparable companies yielded a slightly lower equity value per share, while 
Cadbury’s share price was trading at GBP 5.68 on 4 September 2009, the last business day 
preceding Kraft’s offer announcement and GBP 5.29 on 1 July 2009 prior to any 
speculation regarding a possible consolidation in the confectionery sector.  
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Finally, the precedent transaction analysis conducted places Kraft’s final takeover offer for 
the global leadership position in the confectionery industry, of 13x Cadbury’s 2009 
EBITDA, as the lowest multiple paid in a large mergers and acquisitions deal in the food 
processing industry in a decade prior to Cadbury’s takeover, concluding that Kraft was 
able to acquire an outstanding asset with strong operating momentum at a bargain.   
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Appendix 
 
 
Abstract (English) 
 
Hostile takeovers have been extensively explored during the past years due to their 
increased presence in global M&A activity. Considerable attention has been dedicated to 
the rising complexity of takeover strategies and anti-takeover defence mechanisms 
employed by target companies and the impact of these on shareholders’ wealth. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the background and bitter fight to stay independent 
of one of Britain’s most loved brands, Cadbury Plc., drawing upon existing theories.    
The thesis tries to find answers to the following questions: 
 What was the rationale behind Cadbury’s takeover? 
 What takeover defence mechanisms did the board of Cadbury employ and how 
effective were these in maximizing shareholders’ wealth? 
 Did the price offered by Kraft Foods represent the fair value of Cadbury? 
The paper is divided into seven main chapters. The introduction presents the research 
objectives and short outline of the case analysed. The second chapter provides a theoretical 
framework for hostile takeovers. The third chapter reviews the most commonly employed 
anti-takeover defence mechanisms and the implication of their use. The forth chapter is 
dedicated to the analysis of the background and motivation of Kraft Foods’ hostile 
takeover offer as well as the defence tactics applied by Cadbury Plc. Chapter five outlines 
the theoretical foundation for the Cadbury’s valuation conducted in chapter six, with the 
aim of providing an estimate of the target’s fair value. Chapter seven summarizes and 
concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIII 
 
Abstract (Deutsch) 
 
Aufgrund ihrer verstärkten Präsenz in der globalen M&A Aktivität wurden feindliche 
Übernahmen ausgiebig in den letzten Jahren untersucht. Erhebliche Aufmersamkeit wurde 
der steigenden Komplexität der Übernahmestrategien, den von Zielunternehmen 
eingesetzten Abwehrmaßnahmen sowie den Auswirkungen dieser auf das Vermögen der 
Aktionäre gewidmet. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit analysiert den Hintergrund und den bitteren Kampf um die 
Unabhängigkeit einer der beliebtesten Marken Großbritanniens, Cadbury Plc., wobei auf 
bestehenden Theorien zurückgegriffen wird. 
Es wird versucht Antworten auf folgende Fragen zu formulieren: 
 Welche waren die Beweggründe hinter Cadbury’s Übernahme? 
 Welche waren die Abwehrmaßnahmen, die Cadbury’s Management eingesetzt hat 
und wie erfolgreich waren diese in der Maximierung des Vermögens seiner 
Aktionäre? 
 Widerspiegelt der von Kraft Foods angebotene Preis Cadbury’s fairen Wert? 
Die Arbeit ist in sieben Hauptkapiteln gegliedert. Die Einführung stellt die Forschungsziele 
vor und präsentiert eine kurze Übersicht des untersuchten Falles. Das zweite Kapitel stellt 
einen theoretischen Rahmen für feindliche Übernahmen dar. Das dritte Kapitel beinhaltet 
einen Überblick über die am häufigsten eingesetzten Abwehrmaßnahmen gegen feindliche 
Übernahmen sowie die Auswirkung ihrer Verwendung. Das vierte Kapitel widmet sich der 
Analyse der Hintergründe und der Motivation von Kraft Foods‘ feindlichem 
Übernahmeangebot sowie den von Cadbury Plc. eingesetzten Verteidigungsstrategien. 
Kapitel fünf beschreibt die theoretische Grundlage für die im Kapitel sechs durchgeführte 
Unternehmensbewertung, mit der Absicht den fairen Wert des Zielunternehmens, Cadbury, 
abzuleiten. Die Arbeit schließt mit einer Zusammenfassung und Schlussfolgerung. 
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